

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION	:	Master File No. 12-md-02311 Hon. Marianne O. Battani
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IN RE ALTERNATORS	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-00703-MOB-MKM
IN RE STARTERS	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-01103-MOB-MKM
IN RE IGNITION COILS	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-01403-MOB-MKM
IN RE MOTOR GENERATORS	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-01503-MOB-MKM
IN RE INVERTERS	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-01803-MOB-MKM
IN RE AIR FLOW METERS	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-02003-MOB-MKM
IN RE FUEL INJECTION SYSTEMS	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-02203-MOB-MKM
IN RE VALVE TIMING CONTROL DEVICES	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-02503-MOB-MKM
IN RE ELECTRONIC THROTTLE BODIES	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-02603-MOB-MKM
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THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:	:	
ALL END-PAYOR ACTIONS	:	

**END-PAYOR PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT WITH
HITACHI AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS, LTD. AND
PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION OF SETTLEMENT CLASSES**

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) and (e), End-Payor Plaintiffs hereby move the Court for an Order to:

- (1) Preliminarily approve the proposed settlement of the above-captioned litigations with Defendant Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd. ("HIAMS");
- (2) Provisionally approve the proposed Settlement Classes;

(3) Stay the proceedings against Releasees (as defined in the settlement with HIAMS), in particular HIAMS, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., and Hitachi Ltd. in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement;

(4) Authorize End-Payor Plaintiffs to provide notice of the Settlement Agreement to members of their Settlement Classes at a later date in a form and manner to be approved in advance by this Court; and

(5) Appoint Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel for End-Payor Plaintiffs as Settlement Class Counsel for purposes of this settlement.

In support of this Motion, End-Payor Plaintiffs rely upon and incorporate by reference herein the facts and legal arguments set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Law.

HIAMS consents to this motion and to the entry of the proposed order.

Date: April 2, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ E. Powell Miller

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**MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
END-PAYOR PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT WITH
HITACHI AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS, LTD. AND
PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION OF SETTLEMENT CLASSES**

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether End-Payor Plaintiffs' ("EPPs'") settlement with Defendant Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd. ("HIAMS"), embodied in the Settlement Agreement entered into on March 26, 2015 ("Settlement Agreement") and attached hereto as Exhibit 1, is fair, reasonable, and adequate and should be preliminarily approved;
2. Whether the Court should provisionally certify Settlement Classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 23(a) and (b)(3);
3. Whether the Court should stay the proceedings by EPPs against Releasees (as defined in the settlement agreement with HIAMS), in particular HIAMS, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., and Hitachi, Ltd. in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement;
4. Whether the Court should authorize EPPs to provide notice of the Settlement Agreement to Settlement Class Members (as defined in the Settlement Agreement)¹ at a later date in a form and manner to be approved in advance by this Court; and
5. Whether the Court should appoint Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel for EPPs as Settlement Class Counsel for this settlement.

¹ Unless otherwise defined, capitalized terms shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Settlement Agreement.

CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES

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Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013)

Cason-Merenda v. VHS of Mich., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131006, at *20-21 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2013)

Griffin v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173702 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2013)

In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996)

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 508 (E.D. Mich. 2003)

In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981 WL 2093 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 1981)

In re Foundry Resins Antitrust Litig., 242 F.R.D. 393 (S.D. Ohio 2007)

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In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 22, 2011)

In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2008)

In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013)

IUE-CWA v. Gen. Motors Corp., 238 F.R.D. 583 (E.D. Mich. 2006)

Sheick v. Auto Component Carrier LCC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110411 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2010)

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EPPs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, by and through undersigned Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel, respectfully submit this memorandum in support of their motion seeking preliminary approval of a settlement with Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd. (“HIAMS”) and provisional certification of the proposed Settlement Classes.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems², Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies are among the automotive parts at issue in these coordinated proceedings, *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation* (“*Auto Parts*”), MDL No. 2311. Alternators are electromechanical devices that generate an electric current while engines are in operation. Starters are small electric motors used in starting internal combustion engines. Ignition Coils release electric energy to ignite the fuel/air mixture in cylinders. Motor Generators are electric motors used to power electric drive systems that can also capture energy from the process of stopping a vehicle to generate electricity through regenerative braking. Inverters convert direct current electricity to alternating current. Fuel Injection Systems admit fuel or a fuel/air mixture into engine cylinders, and may include injectors, high pressure pumps, rail assemblies, feed lines and other components sold as a unitary system. Fuel Injection Systems can also be sold as part of a broader system, such as an engine management system, or as separate components, such as the injectors, feed lines, high pressure pumps, and/or rail assemblies. Valve Timing Control Devices control the timing of

² On December 12, 2014, End-Payor Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Intent to File Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaints and Add New Defendants (*see, e.g.*, Case No. 2:13-cv-02203, ECF No. 16), in which they stated the consolidated amended class action complaint to be filed in the Fuel Injection Systems action will consolidate their claims previously asserted in the Air Flow Meters action and Electronic Throttle Bodies action. If the parties agree to the consolidation of these actions, EPPs will amend the definition of the Fuel Injection Systems Settlement Class to include the Air Flow Meters and Electronic Throttle Bodies Settlement Classes and dismiss HIAMS from the Air Flow Meters and Electronic Throttle Bodies Actions.

engine valves' operation, and include the VTC actuator .and/or solenoid valve. Air Flow Meters measure the volume of air flowing into engines. Electronic Throttle Bodies control the amount of air flowing into engines. The settlement agreement with HIAMS also covers automotive sensors, automotive transmission control units and automotive engine control units, which are encompassed by HIAMS's plea agreement with the Department of Justice.³

This action arises from alleged conspiracies among the automotive industry's largest manufacturers, marketers, and sellers of Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies to fix the prices, rig bids, and allocate the market and customers in the United States for such products.

The Alternators Defendants include: DENSO Corp., Hitachi, Ltd., HIAMS, and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. The Starters Defendants include: Denso Corporation, Hitachi, Ltd., HIAMS, Mitsuba Corporation, and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. The Ignition Coils Defendants include: Diamond Electric Mfg. Co., Ltd., Diamond Electric Mfg. Corporation Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Mitsubishi Electric US Holdings, Inc., Mitsubishi Electric Automotive America, Inc., HIAMS, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., DENSO Corporation, and DENSO International America, Inc. The Motor Generators Defendants include: DENSO Corporation, DENSO International America, Inc. Hitachi, Ltd., HIAMS, and Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc. The Inverters Defendants include: HIAMS, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., DENSO Corporation, and DENSO International America, Inc. The Fuel Injection Systems, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies Defendants

³ As defined in the settlement agreement with HIAMS, the "Released Parts" are Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, Electronic Throttle Bodies, Automotive Sensors, Automotive Engine Control Units and Automotive Transmission Control Units. Settlement Agreement ¶ 11.

include: Aisan Industry Co., Ltd., Franklin Precision Industry, Inc., Aisan Corporation of America, Hyundam Industrial Co., Ltd., DENSO Corporation, DENSO International America, Inc., DENSO International Korea Corporation, HIAMS, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., Keihin Corporation, Keihin North America, Inc., Maruyasu Industries Co., Ltd. Mikuni Corporation, Mikuni American Corporation, Mitsuba Corporation, American Mitsuba Corporation, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Mitsubishi Electric US Holdings, Inc., Mitsubishi Electric Automotive America, Inc., Robert Bosch GmbH, and Robert Bosch LLC.⁴ The Valve Timing Control Devices Defendants include: Aisin Seiki Co., Ltd., Aisin Automotive Casting, LLC, Delphi Automotive LLP, Delphi Automotive Systems, LLP, Korea Delphi Automotive Systems Corp., DENSO International Korea Corporation, DENSO Corporation, DENSO International America, Inc., Hitachi, Ltd., HIAMS, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Mitsubishi Electric Automotive America, Mikuni Corporation, and Mikuni American Corporation.

EPPs filed the first class action complaints involving Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies (“Complaints”) against Defendants between February 27, 2013 and October 3, 2013. The Complaints assert claims for relief under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and various State antitrust, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws.

As one of the Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies clusters of class actions (Case Nos. 2:13-cv-00703, 2:13-cv-01103, 2:13-cv-01403, 2:13-cv-01503, 2:13-cv-01803, 2:13-cv-02003, 2:13-cv-02003, 2:13-cv-02203, 2:13-cv-002503, 2:13-

⁴ Each of these Defendants manufactured or sold at least one of the components listed under “Fuel Injection Systems” in EPPs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint. *See* Case No 2:13-cv-02203, ECF No. 18, ¶ 2.

cv-02603) in *Auto Parts*, this Court consolidated and coordinated EPPs' actions for pretrial purposes. The Court also appointed the undersigned firms Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel and Interim Liaison Counsel for the End-Payor Actions in the Master Docket for MDL No. 2311. *See id.*, citing Master File No. 2:12-md-2311, Case No. 2:12-cv-00100 (Aug. 7, 2012, ECF No. 271). Throughout these cases, Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel has represented the interests of the classes of EPPs in this action, including in settlement negotiations with HIAMS. This proposed settlement is a result of those efforts.

EPPs and the classes they seek to represent are consumers and businesses who indirectly purchased and/or leased new vehicles not for resale containing one or more Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies in the United States (i) as a component or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Plaintiffs allege that, in furtherance of the alleged conspiracies, defendants agreed, during meetings and conversations, to unlawfully fix, artificially raise, maintain and/or stabilize prices, rig bids for, and allocate the supply of Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies on a model-by-model basis, and then sold those products at noncompetitive prices to automobile manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere. *See, e.g.*, EPPs' Consolidated Amended Complaint in *In re Fuel Injection Systems* ¶¶ 1, 120.

The United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") has been investigating conspiracies in the market for automotive parts since at least February 2011, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has participated in raids and executed search warrants carried out in some of Defendants' offices. As a result of the DOJ investigation, HIAMS, a party to the Settlement

Agreement that is the subject of this motion, agreed to plead guilty and pay a \$195 million criminal fine for participating in conspiracies among major automotive parts manufacturers, the primary purpose of which was to allocate the supply of, rig bids for, and fix, stabilize and maintain the prices of, starter motors, alternators, air flow meters, valve timing control devices, fuel injection systems, electronic throttle bodies, ignition coils, inverters and motor generators sold to, depending on the product, Nissan Motor Company, Ltd., Honda Motor Company, Ltd., General Motors Company, Toyota Motor Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Chrysler Group LLC, Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. and others in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. *See* HIAMS Plea Agreement at ¶ 4(a), *United States v. Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd.*, 2:13-cr-20707-GCS-PJK (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2013) (ECF No. 8) (Ex. 2). HIAMS's plea agreement with the DOJ also included cooperation obligations and a release covering Automotive Sensors, Automotive Transmission Control Units, and Automotive Engine Control Units.

HIAMS's plea agreement with the DOJ did not include an order for restitution because of the potential for recovery through civil causes of action. The instant settlement is the first in each of the Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies cases. Though occurring early in this litigation, the combined settlements are substantial, providing a guaranteed recovery of \$46,740,000.00 to the End-Payers in these cases. Standing alone, the recovery from HIAMS is significant. But the settlement is even more valuable to the EPPs because it also requires HIAMS to provide early and comprehensive cooperation in the form of, *inter alia*, attorney proffers, interviews with and depositions of witnesses, and the production of certain documents (including transactional data), related to the claims asserted in this case,

including information concerning sales of Released Parts.⁵ The ability to obtain such information without protracted and expensive discovery is quite valuable to EPPs. HIAMS's cooperation will greatly enhance Plaintiffs' ability to prosecute their claims against non-settling defendants.

A payment of \$46,740,000.00 is a meaningful settlement and is a significant early achievement in this litigation. It also bears noting that the Settlement Agreement provides that HIAMS's sales will remain in the case for purposes of computing the treble damages claim against the non-settling defendants and shall be part of any joint and several liability claims against other current or future defendants. *See* Settlement Agreement ¶ 52. In other words, EPPs and the proposed Settlement Classes retain their ability to recover from the remaining defendants the entire damages caused by the alleged conspiracies, even those attributable to HIAMS, less only the amount paid by HIAMS in settlement.

It is respectfully submitted that, for all the reasons set forth, the settlement with HIAMS is in the best interest of the proposed Settlement Classes and merits the Court's preliminary approval. EPPs therefore request the entry of an Order:

1. Preliminarily approving the Settlement;
2. Provisionally certifying the proposed Settlement Classes;
3. Staying the proceedings against Releasees (as defined in the settlement agreement with HIAMS), in particular HIAMS, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., and Hitachi, Ltd. in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement;
4. Authorizing EPPs to provide notice of the Settlement Agreement to class members at a later date, in a form and manner to be approved in advance by this Court; and

⁵ Including Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies sold for installation in vehicles known to be exported to the United States.

5. Appointing Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel for EPPs as Settlement Class Counsel for this settlement.

THE BASIC TERMS AND BACKGROUND OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The Settlement Agreement with HIAMS arises from extensive arm's length and good faith negotiations. Counsel participated in fact-gathering sessions and informational meetings, as well as extensive negotiations that took place through telephone calls and multiple in-person meetings and over the course of two multi-day mediation sessions with Kenneth Feinberg, one of the nation's foremost mediators. Settlement discussions began between the parties several years ago, and two separate mediations were held—two days of mediation with Mr. Feinberg on March 4-5, 2014, which were not successful, followed by another two days of mediation with Mr. Feinberg on December 9-10, 2014. It was only after all of these formal and information settlement negotiations and mediations that a settlement was reached.

The Settlement Classes: The Settlement Agreement defines the Settlement Classes as follows:

“Alternators Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Alternators in the United States, not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Alternators directly or for resale.

“Starters Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Starters in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and

affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Starters directly or for resale.

“Ignition Coils Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Ignition Coils in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Ignition Coils directly or for resale.

“Motor Generators Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Motor Generators in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Motor Generators directly or for resale.

“Inverters Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Inverters in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Inverters directly or for resale.

“Fuel Injection Systems Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Fuel Injection Systems in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and

instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Fuel Injection Systems directly or for resale.

“Valve Timing Control Devices Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Valve Control Timing Devices in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Valve Timing Control Devices directly or for resale.

“Air Flow Meters Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Air Flow Meters in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Air Flow Meters directly or for resale.

“Electronic Throttle Bodies Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Electronic Throttle Bodies in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Electronic Throttle Bodies directly or for resale.

Settlement Amount: HIAMS paid USD 46,740,000.00. *See id.* ¶ 23. The Settlement Amount has been paid into an interest-bearing escrow account at Wells Fargo & Company. *See id.* ¶ 18. Thereafter, EPPs shall allocate the Settlement Amount as follows: For the Alternators

Settlement Class, USD 6,216,420.00 plus accrued interest on said deposits; for the Starters Settlement Class, USD 3,832,680.00 plus accrued interest on said deposits; for the Ignition Coils Settlement Class, USD 7,431,660.00 plus accrued interest on said deposits; for the Motor Generators Settlement Class, USD 2,337,000.00 plus accrued interest on said deposits; for the Inverters Settlement Class, USD 2,337,000.00 plus accrued interest on said deposits; for the Fuel Injection Systems Settlement Class, USD 8,693,640.00 plus accrued interest on said deposits; for the Valve Timing Control Devices Settlement Class, USD 3,972,900.00 plus accrued interest on said deposits; for the Air Flow Meters Settlement Class, USD 5,047,920.00 plus accrued interest on said deposits; and for the Electronic Throttle Bodies, USD 6,870,780.00 plus accrued interest on said deposits. The allocation of the Settlement Amount to the Settlement Classes is subject to approval by the Court after notice to the Settlement Classes as directed by the Court.

Cooperation: HIAMS has agreed to provide extensive cooperation to the proposed Settlement Classes that will significantly aid in the prosecution of antitrust claims against the remaining defendants. A general summary of HIAMS's cooperation obligations is provided below. The full extent of this cooperation is set forth in more detail in Section J of the Settlement Agreement. HIAMS is required to provide, in general, the following types of cooperation, as more specifically set forth in the Settlement Agreement:

(a) All transactional data that HIAMS provided to the DOJ (including all English Translations thereof produced to DOJ) relating to Released Parts;

(b) Documents, if any, provided to Government Entities as of the Execution Date of this Agreement (including all English Translations thereof provided to those Government Entities) relating to their investigation into alleged competition violations with respect to Released Parts, except that HIAMS shall not be required to provide documents protected by the

work product doctrine, attorney-client privilege, prohibited by the relevant antitrust agencies and/or by the law of the relevant foreign jurisdictions, or prohibited by court order;

(c) Pre-existing transactional data from January 1, 1996 to two years from the Execution Date of the Settlement Agreement related to Released Parts; and

(d) (1) Documents, if any, that relate to or concern the allegations in the Complaints and reflect collusion or attempted collusion with respect to Released Parts, by an employee, officer, or director of HIAMS with any employee, officer or director of another manufacturer or seller of the Released Parts; (2) documents, if any, concerning HIAMS's determinations of its prices for Released Parts including pricing policies, formulas and guidelines; and (3) documents, if any, showing how employees were trained or instructed to bid and set prices submitted to purchasers or potential purchasers, for Released Parts, in RFQs, or any other procurement process.

See Settlement Agreement ¶ 37.

Released Claims: The Settlement Agreement releases only HIAMS, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., Hitachi, Ltd., Clarion Co., Ltd., Hitachi Vehicle Energy, Ltd. and HIAMS's subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, and predecessors ("Releasees") from all Settlement Class Member claims arising out of or relating in any way to any conduct alleged in the Complaints or any act or omission of Releasees, concerning the Released Parts. *See* Settlement Agreement ¶ 12. However, the release does not include Hitachi Metals, Ltd. (including the former Hitachi Cable, Ltd.) and Hitachi Chemical Co., Ltd. or (1) any claims made by direct purchasers of Released Parts; (2) any claims made by automotive dealerships that are indirect purchasers of Released Parts; (3) any claims made by any State, State agency, or instrumentality or political subdivision of a State, as to government purchases and/or penalties relating to

Released Parts; (4) claims involving any negligence, personal injury, breach of contract, bailment, failure to deliver lost goods, damaged or delayed goods, product defect, securities, or similar claim relating to Released Parts; (5) claims concerning any automotive part other than Released Parts; (6) claims under laws other than those of the United States and the states thereof; and (7) claims for damages under the state law or local laws of any jurisdiction other than an Indirect Purchaser State. *See Id.* ¶ 25. Further, the Settlement Agreement provides that HIAMS's sales shall remain in the continuing litigation against the non-settling Defendants, who remain jointly and severally liable for all damages caused by the conspiracies. *See id.* ¶ 52.

ARGUMENT

The Settlement Agreement is not only fair, reasonable and adequate resulting from extensive, arm's length negotiations by experienced counsel but also a thoughtfully conceived resolution of the proposed Settlement Classes' claims that maximizes their recovery and guarantees early, significant cooperation by HIAMS in the continued prosecution of EPPs' claims.

I. Preliminary Approval Should Be Granted Because The Proposed Settlement Falls Well Within The Range Of Possible Approval

It is well-established in the Sixth Circuit that there is an overriding public interest in settling and quieting litigation, particularly class actions. *See Griffin v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc.*, Case No. 2:10-cv-10610, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173702, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2013) (citing *UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 497 F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting "the federal policy favoring settlement of class actions")); *see also IUE-CWA v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 238 F.R.D. 583, 593 (E.D. Mich. 2006). "This policy applies with equal force whether the settlement is partial, involving only some of the defendants, or complete." *In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig.*, Case No. 08-MD-01952, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255, at *44 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 22, 2011)

(“*Packaged Ice*”); *see also* *Agretti v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc.*, 982 F.2d 242, 247 (7th Cir. 1992) (“In complex litigation with a plaintiff class, ‘partial settlements often play a vital role in resolving class actions’” (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 30.46 (1986))). In fact, “settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible.” 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1522, at 225-26 (2d ed. 1990) (citing 1983 Advisory Committee Notes); *see also* MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.12 (2004) (“*Manual*”) (“settlement should be explored early in the case”).

Approval of a proposed class action settlement proceeds in two steps. First, the court grants preliminary approval to the settlement and provisionally certifies a settlement class. Second, after notice of the settlement is provided to the class and the court conducts a fairness hearing, the court may grant final approval to the settlement. *See Manual* § 21.63; *see also* *Bobbitt v. Acad. of Reporting*, 2009 WL 2168833, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 21, 2009) (citing authorities).

A proposed settlement agreement should be preliminarily approved if “the preliminary evaluation of the proposed settlement does not disclose grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious deficiencies . . . and [the settlement] appears to fall within the range of possible approval.” *Manual* § 30.41 at 237; *see also* *Int’l Union, UAW v. Ford Motor Co.*, Case Nos. 05-74730, 06-10331, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70471 at *11 (E.D. Mich. July 13, 2006). The district court’s role in reviewing settlements “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Clark Equip. Co. v Int’l Union of Allied Industrial Workers of Am.*, 803 F.2d

878, 880 (6th Cir. 1986). Courts adhere to “an initial presumption of fairness when a proposed class settlement, which was negotiated at arm’s length by counsel for the class, is presented for court approval.” 4 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.41 (4th ed. 2005) (“*Newberg*”) (collecting cases); cf. *Rankin v. Rots*, No. 02-cv-71045, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45706, at *9 (E.D. Mich. June 28, 2006) (“[T]he only question . . . is whether the settlement, taken as a whole, is so unfair on its face as to preclude judicial approval.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In considering whether to grant preliminary approval, the court is not required at this point to make a final determination of the adequacy of the settlement or to delve extensively into the merits of the settlement. See *In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis & Knee Prosthesis Liab. Litig.*, Case No. 1:01-CV-9000, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26714, at *17 (E.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2001) (“*Sulzer Hip*”). These inquiries are reserved for the final approval stage of the class settlement approval process. Nor will any class member’s substantive rights be prejudiced by preliminary approval because the proposed preliminary approval is solely to provide authority for notifying the class of the terms of the settlement agreement to set the stage for review of its final approval. *Id.*; *Newburg* § 11.25. Consequently, courts generally engage only in a limited inquiry to determine whether a proposed settlement falls within the range of possible approval and thus should be preliminarily approved. *Sulzer Hip*, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26714 at *17-18 (preliminary approval may be based on “informal presentations” because of “substantial judicial processes that remain”) (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.41, at 235 (1995)). See also *In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig.*, No. 08-MD-01952, 2010 WL 3070161, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2010), quoting *Gautreaux v. Pierce*, 690 F.2d 616, 621 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982) (inquiry

limited to settlement's potential for final approval and propriety of class notice and fairness hearing).

In evaluating whether a settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, courts in the Sixth Circuit consider a number of factors:

(1) the likelihood of success on the merits weighed against the amount and form of relief in the settlement; (2) the complexity expense and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the opinions of class counsel and class representatives; (4) the amount of discovery engaged in by the parties; (5) the reaction of absent class members; (6) the risk of fraud or collusion; and (7) the public interest. The Court may choose to consider only those factors that are relevant to the settlement at hand and may weigh particular factors according to the demands of the case.

Packaged Ice, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255 at *46-47 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

A court is not required at the preliminary approval stage to determine whether it ultimately will finally approve the settlement. Nevertheless, as set forth in detail below, preliminary consideration of the factors a court considers when evaluating the fairness of a settlement for purposes of deciding whether to grant final approval supports this Court's granting preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement.

A. The Settlement Agreement Achieves An Excellent Result For The Proposed Settlement Classes, Particularly Given the Expense, Duration, and Uncertainty of Continued Litigation

Antitrust class actions are "arguably the most complex action(s) to prosecute. The legal and factual issues involved are always numerous and uncertain in outcome." *In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig.*, Case No. 08-MDL-01952, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150427, at *76 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 13, 2011) (quoting *In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig.*, 292 F. Supp. 2d 631, 639 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ("*Linerboard*")); see also *In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.*, 218 F.R.D. 508, 533 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("*Cardizem*") ("Moreover, the complexity of this case cannot be overstated. Antitrust class actions are inherently complex"). Motions have already been vigorously contested, and the discovery process would be all the more complicated due to the unique issues

that attend discovery against foreign parties.⁶ Additionally, HIAMS would assert various defenses, and a jury trial might well turn on close questions of proof, many of which would be the subject of complicated expert testimony, particularly with regard to damages, making the outcome of such trial uncertain for both parties. *See, e.g., Cardizem*, 218 F.R.D. at 523 (in approving settlement, noting that “the prospect of a trial necessarily involves the risk that Plaintiffs would obtain little or no recovery and that “no matter how confident trial counsel may be, they cannot predict with 100% accuracy a jury’s favorable verdict, particularly in complex antitrust litigation”); *Packaged Ice*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255 at *53-54 (noting the “undeniable inherent risks” in antitrust class action litigation including “whether the class will be certified and upheld on appeal, whether the conspiracies as alleged in the Complaint can be established, whether Plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate class wide antitrust impact and ultimately whether Plaintiffs will be able to prove damages”). *Id.* Given this uncertainty, “[a] very large bird in the hand in this litigation is surely worth more than whatever birds are lurking in the bushes.” *In re Chambers Dev. Sec. Litig.*, 912 F. Supp. 822, 838 (W.D. Pa. 1995).

Moreover, given the stakes involved, an appeal is nearly certain to follow regardless of the outcome at trial. This creates additional risk, as judgments following trial may be overturned on appeal. *See, e.g., In re Farmers Ins. Exchange, Claims Representatives’ Overtime Pay Litig.*, 481 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007) (\$52.5 million class action judgment following trial reversed on appeal); *Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc.*, 116 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997) (jury verdict of \$81 million for plaintiffs reversed and judgment entered for defendant). And, even if class members were willing to assume all of the litigation risks, the passage of time would introduce still more risks in terms of appeals and possible changes in the law that would, in light of the time value of

⁶ Because Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel may have to litigate against the other defendants through trial and appeal, their duties to the Classes preclude a more detailed discussion of their potential litigation risks.

money, make future recoveries less valuable than recovery today. *See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.*, 391 F.3d 516, 536 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t was inevitable that post-trial motions and appeals would not only further prolong the litigation but also reduce the value of any recovery to the class”); *In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig.*, 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 501 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“[A] future recovery, even one in excess of the proposed Settlement, may ultimately prove less valuable to the Classes than receiving the benefits of the proposed Settlement at this time”). Hence, “the certain and immediate benefits to the Class represented by the Settlement outweigh the possibility of obtaining a better result at trial, particularly when factoring in the additional expense and long delay inherent in prosecuting this complex litigation through trial and appeal.” *Cardizem*, 218 F.R.D. at 525.

Against this background, an early settlement providing the substantial benefits afforded here represents an excellent result for the members of the proposed Settlement Classes. HIAMS’s \$46,740,000.00 payment provides for significant compensation to the proposed Settlement Classes that will be available earlier – perhaps years earlier – than would be the case if litigation against HIAMS continued through trial and appeal. Moreover, courts have long recognized that early settlements of this type create value beyond their direct pecuniary benefit to the class. Early settlements can serve as “icebreaker” agreements, strengthening plaintiffs’ hand in the litigation and encouraging future settlements. *See Packaged Ice*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255 at *50-51 (noting “significant value” of icebreaker settlement); *Linerboard*, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 643; *In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.*, 1981 WL 2093, *16 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 1981 (“*Corrugated Container*”).

Of particular importance is the fact that the Settlement Agreement further requires HIAMS to provide substantial cooperation to the EPPs’ counsel by providing factual proffers,

interviews, documents, depositions, and trial testimony, among other cooperation. *See* Settlement Agreement § J. This cooperation is extremely valuable to the classes. The effective early-stage cooperation facilitated by the Settlement Agreement will afford the EPPs access to documents and witnesses without protracted and expensive discovery – a significant class-wide benefit. *See, e.g., In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig.*, Case No. 08-MD-01952, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77645, at *44 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2010) (“Particularly where, as here, there is the potential for a significant benefit to the class in the form of cooperation on the part of the settling Defendant, this Court is reluctant to refuse to consider the very preliminary approval that will trigger that cooperation”); *see also Linerboard*, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 643; *Corrugated Container*, 1981 WL 2093 at *16; *cf. In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig.*, 584 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (“[T]he benefit of obtaining the cooperation of the Settling Defendants tends to offset the fact that they would be able to withstand a larger judgment”).

The value of an early settlement can be so great that early-settling defendants often obtain a substantial discount relative to the remaining defendants. The *Linerboard* court, for example, approved a settlement with the first-settling defendant for less than one percent of sales and approximately one-third of the percentage of sales obtained from the other defendants. Compare *Linerboard*, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 643 (approving icebreaker settlement for approximately 0.4% of sales), with *Linerboard*, 321 F. Supp. 2d 619, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (approving settlements with final two defendants for 1.6% and 2% of sales). In accepting this discounted recovery from the first-settling defendants, the *Linerboard* court emphasized the “substantial” intangible benefit to the class of the icebreaker agreement. 292 F. Supp. 2d at 643.

The Settlement Agreement also specifically provides that it does not purport to alter the non-settling defendants’ joint and several liability for the full damages caused by the alleged

conspiracies, including all sales made by these Defendants. *See* Settlement Agreement ¶ 48. In this regard, the Settlement Agreement is similar to one of the settlements approved in *Corrugated Container*, where the court noted the “valuable provision” under which plaintiffs reserved their right to recover full damages from the remaining defendants, less the actual amount of the initial settlement. 1981 WL 2093 at *17; *see also In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.*, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); *In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.*, 82 F.R.D. 652, 654 (D.D.C. 1979) (approving settlement where class will “relinquish no part of its potential recovery” due to joint and several liability). Here too, the EPPs will be able to pursue their full damages, with no diminution other than deduction of the actual HIAMS settlement amount.

B. The Settlement Agreement Is The Result Of Thorough Arm’s-Length Negotiations Conducted By Highly Experienced Counsel

This settlement is entitled to “an initial presumption of fairness” because it is the result of arm’s-length negotiations among experienced counsel.⁷ *Newberg* § 11.41. The judgment of proposed Settlement Class Counsel that the settlement is in the best interest of the proposed Settlement Classes “is entitled to significant weight, and supports the fairness of the class settlement.” *Sheick v. Auto Component Carrier LCC*, Case No. 2:09-cv-14429, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110411, at *51 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2010) (quoting *IUE-CWA*, 238 F.R.D. at 597); *see also Cardizem*, 218 F.R.D. at 525. Courts give great weight to the recommendation of experienced counsel for the parties in evaluating the adequacy of a settlement.

“Preliminary approval of a proposed settlement is based upon the court’s familiarity with the issues and evidence, as well as the arms-length nature of the negotiations prior to the

⁷ There is no doubt that the counsel who negotiated the Settlement Agreement on behalf of both End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS are highly experienced and capable. *See* End-Payor Plaintiffs’ Application For Appointment Of Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel And Liaison Counsel, *In re Automotive Wire Harness Sys. Antitrust Litig.*, Case No. 12-MD-02311 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 2012), ECF No. 24.

proposed settlement, ensuring that the proposed settlement is not illegal or collusive.” *Thacker v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.*, 259 F.R.D. 262 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (quoting *In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig.*, 130 F.R.D. 366, 370 (S.D. Ohio 1990)). Here, the Settlement Agreement is the result of lengthy and hard-fought negotiations between counsel experienced in complex antitrust and consumer class action litigation. The Settlement Agreement, in its initial form, was negotiated over a period of more than one year by Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel in a process that involved multiple in-person meetings and calls with counsel for HIAMS, as well as two multi-day mediation sessions with Kenneth Feinberg. In preparation for such negotiations, Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel undertook a diligent and thorough investigation of the legal and factual issues posed by this litigation and consulted extensively with experienced economists.

Thus, despite the fact that the Settlement Agreement comes at an early stage of this multidistrict litigation, proposed Settlement Class Counsel was well-informed as to the facts of the case and the strength of the claims asserted when the terms of the Settlement Agreement were initially negotiated. *See Packaged Ice*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255, at *56 (“[T]he absence of formal discovery is not an obstacle [to settlement approval] so long as the parties and the Court have adequate information in order to evaluate the relative position of the parties.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); *Griffin v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173702 (same).

Moreover, these negotiations were adversarial and conducted in the utmost good faith. “Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in class action settlements unless there is evidence to the contrary.” *Leonhardt v. ArvinMeritor, Inc.*, 581 F. Supp. 2d 818, 838 (E.D. Mich. 2008); *Bowers v. Windstream Ky. East, LLC*, Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-440-H, 2013 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 157242, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 1, 2013). There is nothing in the course of the negotiations or the substance of the settlement that “disclose[s] grounds to doubt its fairness.” *Manual* § 30.41.

II. The Proposed Settlement Classes Should Be Provisionally Certified Pursuant To Rule 23

The Manual notes the propriety of certifying a class solely for purposes of settlement, *see Manual* § 21.32, and courts in this Circuit routinely provisionally approve a proposed settlement class before deciding plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. *See, e.g., In re Delphi Corp. Sec. Derivatives & ERISA Litig.*, 248 F.R.D. 483, 486 n. 2 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (granting final approval to both ERISA and Securities settlement classes, noting the court’s earlier, preliminary approval of the settlement classes granted prior to a hearing on defendants’ motions to dismiss); *Cardizem*, 218 F.R.D. at 516-17, 530 (granting final approval of proposed settlement, noting its earlier preliminary approval of both the proposed settlement class and the proposed settlement agreement granted prior to class certification and prior to hearing on motions to dismiss). A court may grant provisional certification where, as here, the proposed settlement classes satisfy the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) (numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy), as well as one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). *See In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig.*, No. 08-MD-01952, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140235, at *27-28 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2010).

While the Supreme Court recently reiterated that a trial court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to confirm that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met, *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011), “the requisite ‘rigorous analysis’ of the record and consideration of the merits must be focused on and limited to the question whether the Rule’s requirements have been established.” *Cason-Merenda v. VHS of Mich., Inc.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131006, at *20-21 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2013) (citing *In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-*

Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 851-52 (6th Cir. 2013)). Permissible inquiry into the merits of plaintiffs' claims at the class certification stage is limited:

Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the class certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the extent – but only to the extent – that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.

Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95 (2013) (“*Amgen*”) (citing *Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. at 2552 n.6). “In other words, district courts may not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the trial on the merits.” *In re Whirlpool Corp.*, 722 F.3d 838, 851-52 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, as demonstrated below, even under a “rigorous analysis,” the requirements of Rule 23 are easily met.

A. The Proposed Settlement Classes Meet The Requirements Of Rule 23(a)

Horizontal price fixing class actions are routinely certified in this District and elsewhere. EPPs' allegations of “a per se violation of the antitrust laws are exactly the kind of allegations which may be proven on a class-wide basis through common proof.” *In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig.*, Master File No. 2:09-MD-1000, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94223, at *35 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 7, 2010). “Courts have held that the existence of a conspiracy is the predominant issue in price fixing cases, warranting certification of the class even where significant individual issues are present.” *Id.* at *33 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “As a rule of thumb, a price fixing antitrust conspiracy model is generally regarded as well suited for class treatment.” *In re Foundry Resins Antitrust Litig.*, 242 F.R.D. 393, 409 (S.D. Ohio 2007); *see also Hyland v. Homeservices of Am., Inc.*, Case No. 3:05-CV-612-R, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90892, at *12 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 2008).

i. The Proposed Settlement Classes Are So Numerous That It Is Impracticable To Bring All Class Members Before The Court

No magic number is required to satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). *Miller v. Univ. of Cincinnati*, 241 F.R.D. 285, 288 (S.D. Ohio 2006). A class representative need only show that joining all members of the potential class is extremely difficult or inconvenient. *Golden v. City of Columbus*, 404 F.3d 950, 965 (6th Cir. 2005). The “sheer number of potential litigants in a class, especially if it is more than several hundred, can be the only factor needed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1).” *In re Foundry Resins Antitrust Litig.*, 242 F.R.D. at 403 (citing *Bacon v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc.*, 370 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 2004)); *see also In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc.*, 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996).

Here, the proposed Settlement Classes consist of from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, or Electronic Throttle Bodies in the United States, not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Since then, it is beyond dispute that millions of persons and entities throughout the United States have purchased or leased vehicles containing Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies for personal use. Because of the large number of putative class members and their geographical distribution throughout the United States, joinder is highly impractical, if not impossible.

ii. End-Payor Plaintiff Class Representatives And The Proposed Settlement Classes Share Common Legal And Factual Questions

Commonality only requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). While Rule 23(a)(2) speaks of questions of law or fact in the plural, “there need be only one common question to certify a class.” *In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-*

Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d at 853; *see also Cason-Merenda*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131006, at *22 (one common question of law or fact is sufficient); *Griffin v. Flagstar Bancorp Inc.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173702 (same); *Date v. Sony Elecs., Inc.*, Case No. 07-15474, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108095, at *10 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2013) (same).

This prerequisite is readily satisfied here because “antitrust price-fixing conspiracy cases, by their nature, deal with common legal and factual questions about the existence, scope and effect of the alleged conspiracy.” *In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig.*, 160 F.R.D. 609, 613 (D. Kan. 1995). Thus, in price fixing cases, courts “have consistently held that the very nature of a conspiracy in an antitrust action compels a finding that common questions of law and fact exist.” *In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.*, No. M 02-1486 PJH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006); *see also Newberg* § 3:10 at 278 (“[In an] antitrust action on behalf of purchasers who have bought defendants’ products at prices that have been maintained above competitive levels by unlawful conduct, the courts have held that the existence of an alleged conspiracy or monopoly is a common issue that will satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2) prerequisite”).

Here, EPPs have identified the following issues common to the proposed Settlement Classes:

- Whether Defendants engaged in combinations and conspiracies among themselves to fix, raise, maintain, or stabilizes the prices of Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies sold in the United States;
- Whether Defendants engaged in combinations and conspiracies among themselves to rig bids quoted to customers of Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies sold in the United States;
- Whether Defendants engaged in combinations and conspiracies to allocate customers and the markets for Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel

Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies sold in the United States;

- The duration of the illegal contracts, combinations, and/or conspiracies;
- Whether Defendants' conduct resulted in unlawful overcharges on the prices of Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies; and
- Whether unlawful overcharges on the price of Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies was passed-through to the indirect purchasers of Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies, and if so, the appropriate measure of damages.

Any one of these substantive issues would, standing alone, establish the requisite commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).

iii. End-Payor Plaintiff Class Representatives' Claims Are Typical Of The Claims Of The Members Of The Proposed Settlement Classes

Third, Rule 23(a) requires typicality of the class representatives' claims. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). "The [typicality] requirement is not onerous," *Int'l Union, UAW v. Ford Motor Co.*, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70471 at *54, and courts liberally construe it. *See In re Foundry Resins Antitrust Litig.*, 242 F.R.D. at 403. "In the antitrust context, typicality is established when the named plaintiffs and all class members allege[] the same antitrust violation by defendants." *Cason-Merenda*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131006 at *25 (quoting *In re Foundry Resins Antitrust Litig.*, 242 F.R.D. at 405); *see also Stout v. J.D. Byrider*, 228 F.3d 709, 717 (6th Cir. 2000); *In re Am. Med. Sys.*, 75 F.3d at 1082; *Packaged Ice*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255 at *40-41. "If there is a strong similarity of legal theories, the requirement [of typicality] is met, even if there are factual distinctions among named and absent class members." *Griffin v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173702, at *17-18 (quotation marks and citation omitted); *Packaged Ice*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255, at *40 (same).

Because the End-Payor Plaintiff Class representatives and the members of the proposed Settlement Classes believe they are all victims of the conspiracies to fix prices, rig bids, and allocate the market and customers for Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies and seek the same relief, Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied. *See Cason-Merenda*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131006 at *26 (finding typicality met where “the claims of the named Plaintiffs and those of the remaining members of the proposed class all arise from the same conspiracy and are based on the same theory of liability under the Sherman Act.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); *Packaged Ice*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255 at *40-41 (“Because all Class Members’ claims arise from . . . a conspiracy to allocate markets in violation of the Sherman Act, their claims are based on the same legal theory and the typicality requirement . . . is met”).

iv. Proposed Settlement Class Counsel and End-Payor Plaintiff Class Representatives Will Fairly and Adequately Protect The Interests Of The Proposed Settlement Classes

The final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the representative parties “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The Sixth Circuit has articulated two criteria for determining adequacy of representation: “1) [t]he representative must have common interests with unnamed members of the class, and 2) it must appear that the representatives will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.” *In re Foundry Resins Antitrust Litig.*, 242 F.R.D. at 407 (quoting *Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir. 1976)). EPPs submit that there are no conflicts between them and the proposed Settlement Classes because EPPs and members of the proposed Settlement Classes: (i) purchased or leased in the United States, not for resale, motor vehicles containing Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing

Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies; and/or (ii) Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies as a stand-alone product, that they have the same interest in establishing liability, and that they all seek damages for the ensuing overcharge. *See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.*, 643 F.2d 195, 208 (5th Cir. 1981) (certifying settlement class and holding that “so long as all class members are united in asserting a common right, such as achieving the maximum possible recovery for the class, the class interests are not antagonistic for representation purposes” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). EPPs and the members of the proposed Settlement Classes also share a common interest in obtaining HIAMS’s early and substantial cooperation in prosecuting the claims against the non-settling Defendants.

Rule 23(g) requires the Court to examine the capabilities and resources of class counsel to determine whether they will provide adequate representation to the class. The proposed Settlement Classes are represented by counsel with extensive experience in antitrust and class action litigation. They have vigorously prosecuted the class claims, and they will continue to do so through all phases of the litigation, including trial. *See Marcus v. Dep’t of Revenue*, 206 F.R.D. 509, 512 (D. Kan. 2002) (“In absence of evidence to the contrary, courts will presume the proposed class counsel is adequately competent to conduct the proposed litigation”). The Court appointed Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Robins Kaplan LLP, and Susman Godfrey L.L.P. as Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel in this action and the other automotive parts antitrust cases within Master File No. 2:12-md-2311. *See Case Management Order No. 3* filed as ECF No. 271. For the same reasons that the Court appointed them to this position, it should appoint them Settlement Class Counsel here.

B. The Proposed Settlement Classes Meet The Requirements Of Rule 23(b)(3)

To qualify for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), a class must meet two requirements beyond the Rule 23(a) prerequisites: common questions must predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; and class resolution must be superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. *Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (“*Amchem*”); *see also In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig.*, 527 F.3d 517, 535 (6th Cir. 2008). With respect to both requirements, the Court need not inquire whether the “case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, for the proposal is that there be no trial.” *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 620 (internal citations omitted).

i. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate

“Rule 23(b)(3) does not mandate that a plaintiff seeking class certification prove that each element of the claim is susceptible to classwide proof.” *In re Whirlpool Corp.*, 722 F.3d at 859. Instead, “[a] claim will meet the predominance requirement when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member’s individualized position.” *In re Foundry Resins Antitrust Litig.*, 242 F.R.D. at 408 (quoting *In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.*, 200 F.R.D. at 307). Common questions need only predominate; they need not be dispositive of the litigation. *Id.* (citing *In re Potash Antitrust Litig.*, 159 F.R.D. 682, 693 (D. Minn. 1995)); *cf. In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig.*, 527 F.3d at 535-36 (holding issues regarding the amount of damages do not destroy predominance). “[T]he mere fact that questions peculiar to each individual member of the class action remain after the common questions of the defendant’s liability have been resolved does not dictate the conclusion that a class action is impermissible.” *Cason-Merenda v. VHS of Mich., Inc.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131006, at *19-20 (quoting *Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Public Defender Comm.*, 501 F.3d 595, 619 (6th Cir. 2007)). As

pertinent to EPPs' request here to provisionally certify the proposed Settlement Classes under Rule 23(b)(3), the Supreme Court very recently instructed that "Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that *questions* common to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class." *Amgen*, 133 S.Ct. at 1191.⁸

Because the proposed Settlement Classes allege actions from which all proposed Settlement Class Members' alleged injuries arise, issues common to the proposed Settlement Class Members – for example, the existence and scope of the alleged price-fixing conspiracy or conspiracies among Defendants, the market impact of Defendants' conspiracy or conspiracies, and the aggregate amount of damage suffered by the class as a result of the alleged antitrust violations – predominate over any individual questions, and therefore class treatment of the claims is appropriate for purposes of this settlement. *See Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 625 ("Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging . . . violations of the antitrust laws."); *see also In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.*, 209 F.R.D. 251, 254 (D.D.C. 2002) ("as a rule, the allegation of a price-fixing conspiracy is sufficient to establish predominance of common questions") (quoting NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 18.28 at 18-98 (3d ed. 1992)). This Circuit has also held "[p]redominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging . . . violations of the antitrust laws, because proof of the *conspiracy* is a common question that is thought to predominate over the other issues of the case." *In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig.*, 527 F.3d at 535

⁸ The Supreme Court's recent decision in *Comcast Corp. v. Behrend*, 133 S.Ct. 1426 (2013), supports the appropriateness of class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) here. In *Comcast*, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that damages could be measured on a class-wide basis because only one of the plaintiffs' four theories of antitrust impact could be proved in a manner common to the class. 133 S.Ct. at 1429-31. Under *Comcast*, plaintiffs must be able to show that their damages stemmed from the defendant's actions that created the legal liability. *See Levva v. Medline Indus, Inc.*, 716 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, all of the proposed Settlement Classes' claimed damages – the overcharge suffered as a result of inflated Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies – stem from the Defendants' alleged price-fixing conspiracies.

(quoting *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 625).⁹ Furthermore, here the evidence that will prove a violation as to one Settlement Class Member is common to the Class and will be sufficient to prove it as to all – the anticompetitive conduct is not dependent on the separate conduct of the individual Settlement Class Members. *See Packaged Ice*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255 at *43.

This is true even if there are individual state law issues, as long as the common issues still outweigh the individual ones, *e.g.*, as long as a common theory can be alleged as to liability and impact that can be pursued by the class. *See, e.g., In re Whirlpool Corp.*, 722 F.3d at 861 (“[I]t remains the ‘black letter rule’ that a class may obtain certification under Rule 23(b)(3) when liability questions common to the class predominate over damages questions unique to class members.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); *Scrap Metal*, 527 F.3d at 535 (where common issues determine liability, fact that damages calculation may involve individualized issues does not defeat predominance). Issues common to the proposed Settlement Classes predominate in this case – all EPPs allegedly paid overcharges that were caused by the Defendants’ price-fixing activities. The presence of these common issues of liability and impact predominates over any individual issues and strongly support provisional certification of the proposed Settlement Classes.

ii. A Class Action Is The Superior Method To Adjudicate These Claims

Rule 23(b)(3) also requires that a class action be superior to other available methods of fairly adjudicating the controversy. The superiority of class certification over other available

⁹ Similarly, other courts have recognized that the existence and scope of an alleged antitrust conspiracy are matters susceptible to class-wide proof, and thus tend to support a finding that common issues predominate over individual ones as to at least the first element of an antitrust conspiracy claim. *See, e.g., Cordes & Co. Financial Services, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.*, 502 F.3d 91, 105 (2d Cir. 2007); *Blades v. Monsanto Co.*, 400 F.3d 562, 572 (8th Cir. 2005); *In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig.*, 280 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2001); *In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig.*, 283 F.R.D. 222, 234 (E.D. Pa. 2012); *Reed v. Advocate Health Care*, 268 F.R.D. 573, 581 (N.D. Ill. 2009); *In re Urethane Antitrust Litig.*, 251 F.R.D. 629, 634 (D. Kan. 2008); *Foundry Resins*, 242 F.R.D. at 408.

methods is measured by consideration of certain factors, including: the class members' interests in controlling the prosecution of individual actions; the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; the desirability of concentrating the litigation of various claims in the particular forum; and the likely difficulties in managing a class action. *Dillworth v. Case Farms Processing, Inc.*, No. 5:08-cv-1694, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20446 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2010).

Courts consistently hold that class actions are a superior method of resolving antitrust claims like those alleged here. *See In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig.*, 219 F.R.D. 661, 678 (D. Kan. 2004) (noting that individual litigation of antitrust claims would be "grossly inefficient, costly, and time consuming"). Here, the interests of Settlement Class Members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims are outweighed by the efficiency of the class mechanism. *Cardizem*, 200 F.R.D. at 325-26 (finding that class action is superior because it ensures fair and efficient adjudication). Millions of persons and entities purchased or leased vehicles containing Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies as a component part or purchased Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies as stand-alone products during the Settlement Class Periods; resolving these claims in the context of a class action would conserve both judicial and private resources and would hasten the class members' recovery. *See, e.g., In re Foundry Resins*, 242 F.R.D. at 411-12 ("Repeatedly litigating the same issues in individual suits would produce

duplicate efforts, unnecessarily increase litigation costs, impose an unwarranted burden on this Court and other courts, and create a risk of inconsistent results”).¹⁰

III. Notice To The Classes

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires the Court to “direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” With regard to class action claims that are settled, Rule 23(e) instructs courts to “direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). “[D]ue process does not require actual notice, but rather a good faith effort to provide actual notice.” *Thacker*, 259 F.R.D. at 271-72. To comport with the requirements of due process, notice must be “reasonably calculated to reach interested parties.” *Fidel v. Farley*, 534 F.3d 508, 514 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing *Karkoukli’s, Inc. v. Dohany*, 409 F.3d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 2005)).

Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel anticipates additional settlements with Defendants in the *Auto Parts* coordinated proceedings. Because it would be most cost-effective and efficient to disseminate notice of this settlement together with notice of other settlements, the parties have agreed to defer dissemination of notice. As set forth in the Settlement Agreement, “End-Payor Plaintiffs shall, at a time to be decided in their sole discretion, in each Action submit to the Court a motion for authorization to disseminate notice of the settlement and final judgment contemplated by this Agreement to all members of the Settlement Classes identified by End-Payor Plaintiffs (the “Notice Motions”).” Settlement Agreement ¶ 21. The Notice Motion to be

¹⁰ Another criterion of Rule 23(b)(3) is manageability. The Supreme Court has made clear that manageability need not be considered where, as here, a class is being certified for settlement purposes. *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 620 (“Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D), for the proposal is that there be no trial”).

subsequently submitted to the Court for its approval shall include “a proposed form of, method for, and date of dissemination of notice.” *Id.* Accordingly, with the Court’s permission, proposed Settlement Class Counsel will submit a proposed motion for authorization to disseminate notice at a later date.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, EPPs respectfully request that the motion for preliminary approval be granted and that the Court enter the accompanying Proposed Order:

1. Preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement;
2. Provisionally certifying the proposed Settlement Classes;
3. Staying the proceedings against Releasees (as defined in the settlement agreement with HIAMS), in particular HIAMS, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., and Hitachi, Ltd. in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement;
4. Authorizing EPPs to provide notice of the Settlement Agreement to members of the Settlement Classes at a later date, in a form to be approved in advance by this Court; and
5. Appointing Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel for the EPPs as Settlement Class Counsel for this settlement.

Date: April 2, 2015

/s/ E. Powell Miller
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*Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel for the
Proposed End-Payor Plaintiff Classes*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, E. Powell Miller, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of **END-PAYOR PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT WITH HITACHI AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS, LTD. AND PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION OF SETTLEMENT CLASSES** and **MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF END-PAYOR PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT WITH HITACHI AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS, LTD. AND PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION OF SETTLEMENT CLASSES** to be served via e-mail upon all registered counsel of record via the Court's CM/ECF system on April 2, 2015.

/s/ E. Powell Miller _____

E. Powell Miller

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

IN RE AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION	:	Master File No. 12-md-02311
	:	
In re Alternators	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-00703-MOB-MKM
In re Starters	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-01103-MOB-MKM
In re Ignition Coils	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-01403-MOB-MKM
In re Motor Generators	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-01503-MOB-MKM
In re Inverters	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-01803-MOB-MKM
In re Air Flow Meters	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-02003-MOB-MKM
In re Fuel Injection Systems	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-02203-MOB-MKM
In re Valve Timing Control Devices	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-02503-MOB-MKM
In re Electronic Throttle Bodies	:	Case No. 2:13-cv-02603-MOB-MKM
	:	
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO	:	
	:	
End-Payor Actions	:	
	:	

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) is made and entered into this 26th day of March, 2015 (“Execution Date”) between Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd. (“HIAMS”), and End-Payor Plaintiff Class Representatives (“End-Payor Plaintiffs”), both individually and on behalf of class(es) of end-payor indirect purchasers of Alternators, Starters, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices, Air Flow Meters, and Electronic Throttle Bodies (“Settlement Classes”) as more particularly defined in Paragraph 14 below.

WHEREAS, End-Payor Plaintiffs are prosecuting the above *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311 (E.D. Mich.) which includes Case No. 2:13-cv-00703 (“Alternators Action”), Case No. 2:13-cv-01103 (“Starters Action”), Case No.

2:13-cv-01403 (“Ignition Coils Action”), Case No. 2:13-cv-01503 (“Motor Generators Action”), Case No. 2:13-cv-01803 (“Inverters Action”), Case No. 2:13-cv-02003 (“Air Flow Meters Action”), Case No. 2:13-cv-02203 (“Fuel Injection Systems Action”), Case No. 2:13-cv-02503 (“Valve Timing Control Devices Action”), and Case No. 2:13-cv-02603 (“Electronic Throttle Bodies Action”) (together, “Actions”) on their own behalf and on behalf of the Settlement Class(es) against, among others, HIAMS and its affiliated companies, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc. and Hitachi, Ltd. (collectively, “HIAMS Defendants”).¹

WHEREAS, End-Payor Plaintiffs allege that they were injured as a result of the HIAMS Defendants’ participation in an unlawful conspiracy to raise, fix, maintain, and/or stabilize prices, rig bids, allocate markets and customers for (1) Alternators in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and various State antitrust, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws as set forth in End-Payor Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint (“Alternators Complaint”); (2) Starters in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and various State antitrust, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws as set forth in End-Payor Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint (“Starters Complaint”); (3) Ignition Coils in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and various State antitrust, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws as set forth in End-Payor Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint (“Ignition Coils Complaint”); (4) Motor Generators in violation of Section 1 of

¹ On December 12, 2014, End-Payor Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Intent to File Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaints and Add New Defendants (*see, e.g.*, Case No. 2:13-cv-02203, ECF No. 16), in which they stated the consolidated amended class action complaint to be filed in the Fuel Injection Systems Action will consolidate their claims previously asserted in the Air Flow Meters Action and Electronic Throttle Bodies Action. If the parties agree to the consolidation of these actions, Plaintiffs will amend the definition of the Fuel Injection Systems Settlement Class to include the Air Flow Meters and Electronic Throttle Bodies Settlement Classes and dismiss HIAMS from the Air Flow Meters and Electronic Throttle Bodies Actions.

the Sherman Act and various State antitrust, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws as set forth in End-Payor Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ("Motor Generators Complaint"); (5) Inverters in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and various State antitrust, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws as set forth in End-Payor Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ("Inverters Complaint"); (6) Fuel Injection Systems in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and various State antitrust, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws as set forth in End-Payor Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ("Fuel Injection Systems Complaint"); (7) Valve Timing Control Systems in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and various State antitrust, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws as set forth in End-Payor Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ("Valve Timing Control Systems Complaint"); (8) Electronic Throttle Bodies in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and various State antitrust, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws as set forth in End-Payor Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ("Electronic Throttle Bodies Complaint"); and (9) Air Flow Meters in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and various State antitrust, unjust enrichment, and consumer protection laws as set forth in End-Payor Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ("Air Flow Meters Complaint") (collectively "Complaints");

WHEREAS, HIAMS Defendants deny End-Payor Plaintiffs' allegations and would assert defenses to End-Payor Plaintiffs' claims;

WHEREAS, arm's-length settlement negotiations have taken place between Settlement Class Counsel (as defined below) and counsel for HIAMS and this Agreement has been reached as a result of those negotiations;

WHEREAS, End-Payor Plaintiffs have conducted an investigation into the facts and the law regarding the Actions and have concluded that resolving the claims asserted in those Actions against the HIAMS Defendants, according to the terms set forth below, is in the best interest of End-Payor Plaintiffs and the Settlement Classes because of the payment of the Settlement Amount and the value of the Cooperation (as those terms are defined below) that HIAMS has agreed to provide pursuant to this Agreement;

WHEREAS, the Actions will continue against Defendants (as defined below) that are not Releasees (as defined below);

WHEREAS, HIAMS, despite its belief that it is not liable for the claims asserted and has good defenses thereto, has nevertheless agreed to enter into this Agreement to avoid further expense, inconvenience, and the distraction of burdensome and protracted litigation, and to obtain the releases, orders, and judgment contemplated by this Agreement, and to put to rest with finality all claims that have been or could have been asserted against the HIAMS Defendants with respect to Alternators, Starters, Air Flow Meters, Electronic Throttle Bodies, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Fuel Injection Systems, Valve Timing Control Devices (also referred to as variable valve timing devices and/or variable timing control devices), based on the allegations in the Actions, as more particularly set out below (collectively, "Alleged Parts"), Automotive Transmission Control Units, Automotive Engine Control Units, or Automotive Sensors;

WHEREAS, HIAMS has agreed to provide Cooperation (as defined below) to End-Payor Plaintiffs in the ongoing prosecution of the Actions as set forth in this Agreement, and represents that such Cooperation will reduce End-Payor Plaintiffs' substantial burden and expense associated with prosecuting the Actions; and

WHEREAS, End-Payor Plaintiffs recognize the benefits of HIAMS's Cooperation and recognize that because of joint and several liability, this Agreement with HIAMS does not impair End-Payor Plaintiffs' ability to collect the full amount of damages to which they and the Settlement Classes (as defined below) may be entitled to in the Actions from non-Releasees, including the damages attributable to the HIAMS Defendants' alleged conduct:

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants, agreements, and releases set forth herein and for other good and valuable consideration, it is agreed by and among the undersigned that the Actions be settled, compromised, and dismissed on the merits with prejudice as to the Releasees, as defined below, and except as hereinafter provided, without costs as to End-Payor Plaintiffs, the Settlement Classes, HIAMS or other Releasees, subject to the approval of the Court, on the following terms and conditions:

A. Definitions

1. "Cooperation" shall refer to those provisions set forth below in Paragraphs 35 - 46.
2. "Cooperation Materials" means any information, testimony, Documents (as defined below) or other material provided by HIAMS under the terms of this Agreement.
3. "Defendant" means any party named as a defendant in the Actions at any time up to and including the date of Final Court Approval (as defined below).
4. "Document" is defined to be synonymous in meaning and equal in scope to the usage of this term in Rule 34(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including without limitation, electronically stored information. A draft or non-identical copy of a document is a separate document within the meaning of this term.

5. “English Translations” means English translations of documents that were originally written in a language other than English that HIAMS has provided to Government Entities (as defined below) relating to their investigations into alleged competition violations with respect to Released Parts (as defined below).

6. “End-Payor Plaintiff Class Representatives” means those Settlement Class Members, as defined in Paragraph 17, who are named plaintiffs in the Complaints.

7. “Indirect Purchaser States” means Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

8. For purposes of this Agreement, “Alternators,” “Starters,” “Ignition Coils,” “Motor Generators,” “Inverters,” “Valve Timing Control Devices,” “Fuel Injection Systems,” “Air Flow Meters,” and “Electronic Throttle Bodies” shall have the same meaning as set forth in the Complaints at the time this Agreement is executed. For the purposes of this Agreement, “Automotive Engine Control Units” are devices that calculate the optimal quantity of fuel to inject and the ignition timing based on signals from various sensors that detect information relating to, for example, the revolutions of the engine and the driver’s use of the throttle pedal. “Automotive Engine Control Units” also send signals communicating the results of these calculations to the injectors and ignition coils. For the purposes of this Agreement, “Automotive Transmission Control Units” are devices that optimize the transmission shift timing and the transmission ratio based on the signals from the various sensors, including those for throttle opening, coolant temperature, and speed. “Automotive Transmission Control Units” also send signals to the oil

pressure solenoid valve and control the transmission. For the purposes of this Agreement, “Automotive Sensors” are devices that detect critical internal and external vehicle parameters and transmit those signals to the vehicle’s computer modules.

9. “Opt-Out Deadline” means the deadline set by the Court for the timely submission of requests by Settlement Class Members to be excluded from the Settlement Class(es).

10. “Released Claims” are all claims and potential claims against Releasees that are released by this Agreement as described in Paragraphs 25 and 26 herein.

11. “Released Parts” refer to Alternators, Starters, Air Flow Meters, Electronic Throttle Bodies, Ignition Coils, Motor Generators, Inverters, Automotive Transmission Control Units, Automotive Engine Control Units, Automotive Sensors, Fuel Injection Systems, and Valve Timing Control Devices (also referred to as variable valve timing devices and/or variable timing control devices).

12. “Releasees” refer to Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd., Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., Hitachi, Ltd., Clarion Co., Ltd., Hitachi Vehicle Energy, Ltd. and HIAMS’s subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, and predecessors. Notwithstanding, for the purposes of this Agreement, Releasees do not include Hitachi Metals, Ltd. (including the former Hitachi Cable, Ltd.) and Hitachi Chemical Co., Ltd.

13. “Releasers” refer to the Settlement Class Members, as defined in Paragraph 17, below, and to their past and present officers, directors, employees, agents, stockholders, attorneys, servants, representatives, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, insurers and all other persons, partnerships or corporations with whom any of the former have been, or are now, affiliated, and the predecessors, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of any of the foregoing.

14. For purposes of this Agreement, the “Settlement Classes” are defined as follows:

(a) “Alternators Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000 through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Alternators in the United States not for resale (1) as a component in a new vehicle or (2) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Alternators directly or for resale.

(b) “Starters Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000 through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Starters in the United States not for resale (1) as a component in a new vehicle or (2) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Starters directly or for resale.

(c) “Ignition Coils Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000 through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Ignition Coils in the United States not for resale (1) as a component in a new vehicle or (2) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Ignition Coils directly or for resale.

(d) “Motor Generators Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000 through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Motor Generators in the United States not for resale (1) as a component in a new vehicle or (2) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and

instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Motor Generators directly or for resale.

(e) “Inverters Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000 through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Inverters in the United States not for resale (1) as a component in a new vehicle or (2) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Inverters directly or for resale.

(f) “Fuel Injection Systems Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000 through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Fuel Injection Systems in the United States not for resale (1) as a component in a new vehicle or (2) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Fuel Injection Systems directly or for resale.

(g) “Valve Timing Control Devices Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000 through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Valve Control Timing Devices in the United States not for resale (1) as a component in a new vehicle or (2) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Valve Timing Control Devices directly or for resale.

(h) “Air Flow Meters Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000 through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Air Flow Meters in the United States not for resale (1) as a component in a new vehicle or (2) as a stand-alone product.

Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Air Flow Meters directly or for resale.

(i) “Electronic Throttle Bodies Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000 through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Electronic Throttle Bodies in the United States not for resale (1) as a component in a new vehicle or (2) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Electronic Throttle Bodies directly or for resale.

15. “Class Period” is from January 1, 2000 through the Execution Date of this Agreement.

16. “Settlement Class Counsel” shall refer to the law firms of:

Cotchett, Pitre, & McCarthy LLP
San Francisco Airport Office Center
840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200
Burlingame, CA 94010

Robins Kaplan LLP
601 Lexington Avenue, Suite 3400
New York, NY 10022

Susman Godfrey L.L.P.
1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 950
Los Angeles, CA 90067

17. “Settlement Class Member” means each member of the Settlement Classes who has not timely elected to be excluded from the Settlement Classes.

18. “Settlement Amount” shall be USD 46,740,000.00 and any income or interest earned upon this sum after it is deposited into the Escrow Account(s) (as defined below). The allocation of the Settlement Amount to the Settlement Classes defined in Paragraph 14 above shall be determined by Settlement Class Counsel and subject to approval by the Court after notice to the Settlement Classes as directed by the Court.

B. Approval of this Agreement and Dismissal of Claims Against HIAMS Defendants

19. End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS shall use their best efforts to effectuate this Agreement, including cooperating in seeking the Court’s approval for the establishment of procedures (including the giving of class notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) and (e)) to secure the complete and final dismissal with prejudice of the Actions as to the Releasees only.

20. After notice to HIAMS, End-Payor Plaintiffs shall in each Action submit to the Court a motion seeking preliminary approval (“Preliminary Approval”) of this Agreement (“Motions”). The Motions shall include the proposed form of an order preliminarily approving this Agreement. The text of the proposed form of an order preliminarily approving this Agreement shall be subject to good faith efforts to agree by End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS before submission of the Motions. End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS agree to use their best efforts to obtain Preliminary Approval from the Court by April 15, 2015.

21. After notice to HIAMS, End-Payor Plaintiffs shall, at a time to be decided in their sole discretion, in each Action submit to the Court a motion for authorization to disseminate notice of the settlement and final judgment contemplated by this Agreement to all members of the Settlement Classes identified by End-Payor Plaintiffs (“Notice Motions”). To mitigate the costs of notice, End-Payor Plaintiffs shall endeavor to disseminate a combined notice to the Settlement

Classes of this settlement and any other settlements that have been or are reached by the time of the Notice Motions. The Notice Motions shall include a proposed form of, method for, and date of dissemination of notice in each Action.

22. End-Payor Plaintiffs shall seek, and HIAMS will not object unreasonably to, the entry of an order and final judgment in each Action, the text of which End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS shall agree upon. The terms of such orders and final judgments will include, at a minimum, the substance of the following provisions:

(a) certifying the Settlement Classes described in Paragraph 14, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, solely for purposes of this settlement as a settlement class for each Action;

(b) as to the Actions, approving finally this settlement and its terms as being a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement as to the Settlement Class Members within the meaning of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and directing its consummation according to its terms;

(c) as to the HIAMS Defendants, directing that the Actions be dismissed with prejudice and, except as provided for in this Agreement, without costs;

(d) reserving exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement and this Agreement, including the administration and consummation of this settlement, as well as over HIAMS, for the duration of its provision of Cooperation pursuant to this Agreement, to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan;

(e) determining under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that there is no just reason for delay and directing that the judgments of dismissal in each Action as to the HIAMS Defendants shall be final; and

(f) providing that (1) the Court's certification of the Settlement Class is without prejudice to, or waiver of, the rights of any Defendant, including HIAMS (if this settlement is vacated or terminated), to contest certification of any other class proposed in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311, (2) the Court's findings in this Order shall have no effect on the Court's ruling on any motion to certify any class in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311; and (3) no party may cite or refer to the Court's approval of the Settlement Class as persuasive or binding authority with respect to any contested motion to certify any such class.

23. This Agreement shall become final when (1) the Court has entered in each Action a final order certifying the Settlement Class(es) described in Paragraph 14 and approving this Agreement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) and a final judgment dismissing the Action with prejudice as to the HIAMS Defendants against all Settlement Class Members and without costs other than those provided for in this Agreement, and (2) the time for appeal or to seek permission to appeal from the Court's approval of this Agreement and entry of a final judgment as to the HIAMS Defendants described in (1) hereof has expired in each Action and no motion or other pleading has been filed with the Court (or with any other court) seeking to set aside, enjoin, or in any way alter the judgment or final approved order in each Action or to toll the time for appeal of the judgment in each Action or, if appealed, approval of this Agreement and the final judgment in each Action as to the HIAMS Defendants has been affirmed in their entirety by the court of last resort to which such appeal has been taken and such affirmance has become no longer

subject to further appeal or review (“Final Court Approval”). It is agreed that the provisions of Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall not be taken into account in determining the above-stated times. On the date that End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS have executed this Agreement, End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS shall be bound by its terms and this Agreement shall not be rescinded except in accordance with Paragraphs 28(g), 47 or 48 of this Agreement.

24. Neither this Agreement (whether or not it should become final) nor the final judgment in each of the Actions, nor any and all negotiations, documents and discussions associated with them, shall be deemed or construed to be an admission by HIAMS or the Releasees, or evidence of any violation of any statute or law or of any liability or wrongdoing whatsoever by HIAMS or the Releasees, or of the truth of any of the claims or allegations contained in any complaint or any other pleading filed in the Actions, and evidence thereof shall not be discoverable or used directly or indirectly, in any way, whether in the Actions or in any other action or proceeding against the HIAMS Defendants and any other Releasees. Neither this Agreement, nor any of its terms and provisions, nor any of the negotiations or proceedings connected with it, nor any other action taken to carry out this Agreement by HIAMS, shall be referred to, offered as evidence or received in evidence in any pending or future civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceedings, except in a proceeding to enforce this Agreement, or to defend against the assertion of Released Claims, or as otherwise required by law. Nothing in this Paragraph shall prevent End-Payor Plaintiffs from using Cooperation Materials produced pursuant to Paragraphs 35 - 46 for the prosecution of the claims in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311.

C. Release, Discharge, and Covenant Not to Sue

25. In addition to the effect of any final judgment entered in accordance with this Agreement, upon this Agreement becoming final, as set out in Paragraph 23 of this Agreement, and in consideration of payment of the Settlement Amount as specified in Paragraph 27 of this Agreement, and for other valuable consideration, the Releasees shall be completely released, acquitted, and forever discharged from any and all claims, demands, actions, suits, causes of action, whether class, individual, or otherwise in nature (whether or not any Settlement Class Member has objected to this Agreement or makes a claim upon or participates in the Settlement Amount whether directly, representatively, derivatively or in any other capacity) that Releasers, or each of them, ever had, now has, or hereafter can, shall, or may ever have, that now exist or may exist in the future, on account of, or in any way related to, the conduct alleged in the Complaints or any act or omission of the Releasees (or any of them), concerning all Released Parts, including but not limited to any conduct alleged, and causes of action asserted or that could have been alleged or asserted, in any class action or other complaints filed in the Actions concerning Released Parts, provided, however, that nothing herein shall release: (1) any claims made by direct purchasers of Released Parts; (2) any claims made by automotive dealerships that are indirect purchasers of Released Parts in *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311 (E.D. Mich.) (“Automotive Dealership Plaintiffs”); (3) any claims made by any State, State agency, or instrumentality or political subdivision of a State, as to government purchases and/or penalties relating to Released Parts; (4) claims involving any negligence, personal injury, breach of contract, bailment, failure to deliver lost goods, damaged or delayed goods, product defect, securities, or similar claim relating to Released Parts; (5) claims concerning any automotive part other than Released Parts; (6) claims under laws other than those of the United States and the states thereof; and (7) claims for damages under the state law or local laws of any jurisdiction other than an

Indirect Purchaser State. (“Released Claims”). Releasors shall not, after the date of this Agreement, seek to establish liability against any Releasee based, in whole or in part, upon any of the Released Claims or conduct at issue in the Released Claims unless this Agreement is, for any reason, not finally approved or terminated.

26. In addition to the provisions of Paragraph 25 of this Agreement, Releasors hereby expressly waive and release, with respect to the Released Claims, upon this Agreement becoming final, any and all provisions, rights, and benefits conferred by section 1542 of the California Civil Code, which states:

A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR[;]

or by any law of any state or territory of the United States, or principle of common law, which is similar, comparable, or equivalent to section 1542 of the California Civil Code. Each Releasor may hereafter discover facts other than or different from those which he, she, or it knows or believes to be true with respect to the claims which are released pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 25 of this Agreement, but each Releasor hereby expressly waives and fully, finally, and forever settles and releases, upon this Agreement becoming final, any known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, contingent or non-contingent claim that HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs have agreed to release pursuant to Paragraph 25, whether or not concealed or hidden, without regard to the subsequent discovery or existence of such different or additional facts.

D. Settlement Amount

27. Subject to the provisions hereof, and in full, complete and final settlement of the Actions as provided herein, HIAMS shall pay or cause to be paid the Settlement Amount. The

Settlement Amount shall be paid in United States Dollars into an escrow account or accounts to be administered in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 28 of this Agreement (“Escrow Account(s)”) within thirty (30) days following execution of this Agreement and being provided with account number, account name, and wiring information for the Escrow Account(s). No part of the Settlement Amount paid by HIAMS shall constitute, nor shall it be construed or treated as constituting, a payment for treble damages, fines, penalties, forfeitures or punitive recoveries.

E. Escrow Account(s)

28. (a) The Escrow Account(s) will be established at Wells Fargo Bank with such Bank serving as escrow agent (“Escrow Agent”) subject to escrow instructions mutually acceptable to Settlement Class Counsel and HIAMS, such escrow to be subject to the Court’s supervision and control.

(b) The Escrow Agent shall cause the Settlement Amount to be deposited into the applicable Escrow Account(s) to be invested in short-term instruments backed by the full faith and credit of the United States Government or fully insured in writing by the United States Government, or money market funds rated Aaa and AAA, respectively, by Moody’s Investor Services and Standard and Poor’s, invested substantially in such instruments, and shall reinvest any income from these instruments and the proceeds of these instruments as they mature in similar instruments at their then current market rates. HIAMS shall bear no risk related to the Settlement Amount. All funds held in the Escrow Account(s) shall be deemed and considered to be in custodia legis of the Court, and shall remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, until such time as such funds shall be distributed pursuant to this Agreement or further order(s) of the Court.

(c) End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS agree to treat the Settlement Amount as being at all times a “Qualified Settlement Fund” within the meaning of Treasury Regulation § 1.468B-1. In

addition, the Escrow Agent shall timely make such elections as necessary or advisable to carry out the provisions of this Paragraph 28, including the “relation-back election” (as defined in Treasury Regulation § 1.468B-1(j)) back to the earliest permitted date. Such elections shall be made in compliance with the procedures and requirements contained in such regulations. It shall be the responsibility of the Escrow Agent to timely and properly prepare and deliver the necessary documentation for signature by all necessary parties, and thereafter to cause the appropriate filing to occur. All provisions of this Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Settlement Amount being a “Qualified Settlement Fund” within the meaning of Treasury Regulation § 1.468B-1.

(d) For the purpose of § 468B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, the administrator for the Escrow Account(s) shall be an independent consulting firm or certified public accounting firm designated by and under supervision of Settlement Class Counsel. (“Tax Administrator”) The Tax Administrator shall timely and properly file all informational and other tax returns necessary or advisable with respect to the Settlement Amount (including without limitation the returns described in Treasury Regulation § 1.468B-2(k) and (l)). Such returns (as well as the election described in Paragraph 28(c)) shall be consistent with Paragraph 28(c) and in all events shall reflect that all Taxes, as defined below (including any estimated Taxes, interest or penalties), on the income earned by the Settlement Amount shall be paid out of the Settlement Amount as provided in Paragraph 28(f) hereof.

(e) All (1) taxes (including any estimated taxes, interest or penalties) arising with respect to the income earned by the Settlement Amount, including any taxes or tax detriments that may be imposed upon HIAMS or any Releasee with respect to any income earned by the

Settlement Amount for any period during which the Settlement Amount does not qualify as a Qualified Settlement Fund for federal or state income tax purposes (“Taxes”); and (2) expenses and costs incurred in connection with the operation and implementation of Paragraph 28(c) through (f) (including, without limitation, expenses of tax attorneys and/or accountants and mailing and distribution costs and expenses relating to filing (or failing to file) the returns described in this Paragraph 28 (“Tax Expenses”)), shall be paid out of the Settlement Amount. For the purpose of Paragraph 28(b) through (f), references to the Settlement Amount shall include the Settlement Amount and any earnings thereon after being deposited in the Escrow Account(s).

(f) Neither HIAMS nor any Releasee nor their respective counsel shall have any liability or responsibility for the Taxes or the Tax Expenses or the filing of any tax returns or other documents with the Internal Revenue Service or any other taxing authority. The Escrow Agent and/or Class Counsel shall indemnify and hold HIAMS and the Releasees harmless for Taxes and Tax Expenses (including taxes payable by reason of such indemnification). Further, Taxes and Tax Expenses shall be treated as, and considered to be, a cost of administration of the Settlement Amount and shall be timely paid by the Tax Administrator out of the Settlement Amount without prior order from the Court and the Escrow Agent shall be obligated (notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary) to withhold from distribution to any claimants authorized by the Court any funds necessary to pay such amounts including the establishment of adequate reserves for any Taxes and Tax Expenses (as well as any amounts that may be required to be withheld under Treasury Regulation § 1.468B-2(1)(2)). HIAMS or any Releasees shall not be responsible or have any liability therefor or for any reporting requirements that may relate thereto. End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS agree to cooperate with the Escrow Agent, each other, and their tax

attorneys and accountants to the extent reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of Paragraph 28(c) through (f).

(g) If this Agreement does not receive Final Court Approval, including final approval of the Settlement Classes as defined in Paragraph 14, or if the Actions are not certified as class actions for settlement purposes, then the Settlement Amount (other than costs expended or incurred in accordance with Paragraph 30), shall be returned to HIAMS from the applicable Escrow Account(s) by the Escrow Agent along with any interest accrued thereon within thirty (30) calendar days of the Court's final determination.

F. Exclusions

29. Subject to Court approval, any person or entity seeking exclusion from the Settlement Class(es) must file a written request for exclusion by the Opt-Out Deadline, which shall be the date set by the Court by which any class member must request exclusion from the Settlement Class(es). Any person or entity that files such a request shall be excluded from the Settlement Class(es) and shall have no rights with respect to this settlement. Subject to Court approval, a request for exclusion that does not comply with all of the provisions set forth in the applicable class notice will be invalid, and the person(s) or entity(ies) serving such an invalid request shall be deemed Settlement Class Member(s) and shall be bound by this Agreement upon Final Court Approval. Settlement Class Counsel shall, within ten (10) business days of the Opt Out Deadline, provide HIAMS with a list and copies of all opt out requests it receives in each of the Actions and shall file under seal with the Court a list of all members of the Settlement Classes who timely and validly opted out of the settlement.

(a) Subject to Court Approval, any member of the Settlement Class(es) who submits a valid and timely request for exclusion will not be a Settlement Class Member and shall not be

bound by the terms of this Agreement. HIAMS reserves all of its legal rights and defenses, including but not limited to any defenses relating to whether any excluded member of the Settlement Classes is an indirect purchaser of Released Parts.

(b) Subject to Court Approval, in the written request for exclusion, the member of the Settlement Classes must state his, her, or its full name, address, and telephone number. Further, the member of Settlement Classes must include a statement in the written request for exclusion that he, she, or it wishes to be excluded from the settlement.

(c) HIAMS or Settlement Class Counsel may dispute an exclusion request, and the parties shall, if possible, resolve the disputed exclusion request by agreement and shall inform the Court of their position, and, if necessary, obtain a ruling thereon within thirty (30) days of the Opt-Out Deadline.

G. Payment of Expenses

30. HIAMS agrees to permit use of a maximum of USD 1,000,000 of the Settlement Amount on a non-recoupable basis towards the cost of providing notice to the Settlement Classes and the costs of administration of the Settlement Amount after it is paid into the Escrow Account(s). To the extent such expenses have been paid or incurred for notice and administration costs, the notice and administration expenses (up to the maximum of USD 1,000,000) are not recoupable if this settlement does not become final or is terminated. All remaining expenses shall be recoupable if this Agreement does not become final or is terminated. Other than as set forth in this Paragraph 30, HIAMS shall not be liable for any of the costs or expenses of the litigation incurred by End-Payor Plaintiffs in the Actions, including attorneys' fees; fees and expenses of expert witnesses and consultants; and costs and expenses associated with discovery, motion

practice, hearings before the Court or any Special Master, appeals, trials or the negotiation of other settlements, or for Settlement Class administration and costs.

H. The Settlement Amount

31. Releasors shall look solely to the Settlement Amount for settlement and satisfaction against the Releasees of all Released Claims, and shall have no other recovery against HIAMS or any Releasee for any Released Claims.

32. After this Agreement becomes final within the meaning of Paragraph 23, the Settlement Amount shall be distributed in accordance with plans to be submitted at a time to be determined in the sole discretion of Settlement Class Counsel, subject to approval by the Court. In no event shall any Releasee have any responsibility, financial obligation, or liability whatsoever with respect to the investment, distribution, or administration of the Settlement Amount, including, but not limited to, the costs and expenses of such distribution and administration, with the exception of the provisions set forth in Paragraph 30 of this Agreement.

33. End-Payor Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel shall be reimbursed subject to Court approval and indemnified solely out of the Settlement Amount for their costs and expenses. HIAMS and the Releasees shall not be liable for any costs, fees, or expenses of any of End-Payor Plaintiffs' or the Settlement Classes' respective attorneys, experts, advisors, agents, or representatives, but all such costs, fees, and expenses as approved by the Court shall be paid out of the Settlement Amount.

I. Settlement Class Counsel's Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Class Representatives

34. (a) Settlement Class Counsel may, after Preliminary Approval of this Agreement at a time to be determined in their sole discretion, submit an application to the Court

(“Fee and Expense Application”) for the following payments to be made to Settlement Class Counsel after Final Court Approval of this Agreement: (1) an award of attorneys’ fees not in excess of one-third of the Settlement Amount, plus (2) reimbursement of expenses and costs incurred in connection with prosecuting the Actions and incentive awards, plus interest on such attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses at the same rate and for the same period as earned by the Settlement Amount (until paid) as may be awarded by the Court (“Fee and Expense Award”). Settlement Class Counsel reserve the right to make additional applications from time to time for fees and expenses incurred and reasonable incentive awards, but in no event shall Releasees be responsible to pay any such additional fees and expenses except to the extent they are paid out of the Settlement Amount.

(b) Subject to Court approval and except as provided herein, End-Payor Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel shall be reimbursed and paid solely out of the Settlement Amount for all expenses including, but not limited to, attorneys’ fees and past, current, or future litigation expenses. Attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded by the Court shall be payable from the Settlement Amount upon award, notwithstanding the existence of any timely filed objections thereto, or potential appeal therefrom, or collateral attack on the settlement or any part thereof, subject to Settlement Class Counsel’s obligation to make appropriate refunds or repayments to the Settlement Amount, if and when, as a result of any appeal and/or further proceedings on remand, or successful collateral attack, the fee or award of expenses is reduced or reversed, or in the event this Agreement is rescinded or terminated pursuant to Paragraphs 47 or 48.

(c) The procedure for and the allowance or disallowance by the Court of the application by Settlement Class Counsel for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses, and incentive awards for class representatives to be paid out of the Settlement Amount are not part of this

Agreement, and are to be considered by the Court separately from the Court's consideration of the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement, and any order or proceeding relating to the Fee and Expense Application, or any appeal from any such order shall not operate to terminate or cancel this Agreement, or affect or delay the finality of the judgment approving the settlement.

(d) Neither HIAMS nor any Releasee under this Agreement shall have any responsibility for, or interest in, or liability whatsoever with respect to any payment to Settlement Class Counsel of any Fee and Expense Award in the Actions.

(e) Neither HIAMS nor any Releasee under this Agreement shall have any responsibility for, or interest in, or liability whatsoever with respect to the allocation among Settlement Class Counsel, and/or any other person who may assert some claim thereto, of any Fee and Expense Award that the Court may make in the Actions.

J. Cooperation

35. In return for the release and discharge provided herein, in addition to the Settlement Amount it will pay, HIAMS agrees to provide substantial Cooperation to End-Payor Plaintiffs as set forth below. All such Cooperation shall occur in a manner that is in compliance with HIAMS's obligations to any Government Entity (as defined below). HIAMS shall not be required to provide documents protected by the work product doctrine, attorney-client privilege, prohibited by the relevant antitrust agencies and/or by the law of the relevant foreign jurisdictions, or prohibited by court order. Cooperation shall be limited to Released Parts and shall not include information relating to other parts manufactured by HIAMS and/or Releasees.

36. Within thirty (30) days of the Preliminary Approval, counsel for HIAMS shall provide Settlement Class Counsel with the names of all current and former employees, directors and officers of the HIAMS Defendants who: (1) were interviewed and/or prosecuted by the United

States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, the European Commission, or any other government entity (collectively referred to herein as “Government Entities”) in connection with alleged violations with regard to any Released Parts; (2) appeared before the grand jury in connection with the DOJ’s investigation into alleged antitrust violations with respect to any Released Parts; and/or (3) were disclosed to a Government Entity as having knowledge or information relating to investigations into alleged violations with respect to any Released Parts. Counsel for HIAMS shall not be required to disclose to Settlement Class Counsel the specific Government Entities to which each such current or former employee, director or officer of the HIAMS Defendants was identified to or appeared before.

37. Except as set forth herein, HIAMS will use its best efforts to substantially complete the production of the following Documents within the time frames set forth in this Paragraph 37 to the extent such Documents have not already been produced to Settlement Class Counsel and excluding those Documents protected by the work product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege, prohibited by the relevant antitrust agencies and/or by the law of the relevant foreign jurisdiction, or prohibited by court order. End-Payor Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel agree that all Documents and any other Cooperation Materials produced by HIAMS pursuant to this Paragraph 37 shall be treated as “Highly Confidential,” as said designation is described in the protective orders that will be issued in the Actions (“Protective Orders”) unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the Court, and that they shall not use the information so received for any purpose other than the prosecution of the claims in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311.

(a) Within thirty (30) calendar days of Preliminary Approval, all transactional data that HIAMS provided to the DOJ (including all English Translations thereof produced to DOJ) relating to Released Parts.

(b) Within sixty (60) days of Preliminary Approval, Documents, if any, provided to Government Entities as of the Execution Date of this Agreement (including all English Translations thereof provided to those Government Entities) relating to their investigation into alleged competition violations with respect to Released Parts, to the extent they have not already been produced to Settlement Class Counsel, except those documents protected by the work product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege, or prohibited by the relevant antitrust agencies and/or by the law of the relevant foreign jurisdiction, or prohibited by court order.

(c) At the request of End-Payor Plaintiffs and subject to meet and confer with HIAMS, (i) within one hundred eighty (180) days, pre-existing transactional data related to Released Parts from January 1, 1996 to the Execution Date of this Agreement, and (ii) at a time agreed upon between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs, transactional data related to Released Parts from the Execution Date of this Agreement until two (2) years from the Execution Date of this Agreement, including the following information: (1) the date for each bid, price submission, or sale; (2) the price submitted in each bid or price submission;² (3) bids and price submissions formulated but not submitted due to agreements or understandings with co-conspirators; (4) the final price of each sale; (5) the purchaser to whom each bid or price submission was submitted and each sale was made; (6) the model, model year(s) and brand of car for which each bid and price submission was submitted and each sale was made, as well as the country of sale of said cars; (7) the total amount of each Released Part sold in each sale; (8) the location where each bid and price submission was

² Price submission includes any price reduction proposals.

submitted and each sale was made; (9) the HIAMS entity which submitted each bid or price submission and made each sale; (10) the sale agreements and contracts for each sale or price adjustment/reduction; (11) the value engineering and other price adjustments (including price reductions) requested and made to the Released Parts sold in each sale; (12) any ancillary costs associated with each sale such as tooling costs; (13) the identity of any other bids or prices submitted by competitors, including each winning bid; (14) adjustments made to each bid and price submission as it was being formulated; (15) specifications for each bid or price submission; (16) HIAMS entities' profits, losses and margins on the Released Parts; (17) data and documents showing HIAMS entities' costs to produce the Released Parts; and (18) any other transactional data or documents reasonably agreed to in writing between HIAMS's counsel and Settlement Class Counsel. It is understood that certain categories of the aforementioned information are not maintained by HIAMS in the form of transactional data. This request does not require HIAMS to compile any data from any less centralized or comprehensive source including without limitation individual invoices, purchase orders, personal computers, backup recording media or devices, hard copy files, or manufacturing facilities.

(d) Within one hundred eighty (180) days of Preliminary Approval at the request of End-Payor Plaintiffs and subject to a meet and confer with HIAMS (1) Documents, if any, that relate to or concern the allegations in the Complaints and reflect collusion or attempted collusion with respect to Released Parts, by an employee, officer, or director of HIAMS with any employee, officer or director of another manufacturer or seller of the Released Parts; (2) Documents, if any, concerning HIAMS's determinations of its prices for Released Parts including pricing policies, formulas and guidelines; and (3) Documents, if any, showing how employees were trained or instructed to bid and set prices submitted to purchasers or potential purchasers for Released Parts,

in RFQs, or any other procurement process, including Documents stating the lowest bid or price employees were authorized to submit, how to determine the lowest allowable bid or price, and when and how to increase or decrease a proposed bid or price.

38. For all Documents withheld from production pursuant to (1) the attorney-client privilege; (2) the work product doctrine; (3) a protective order, or (4) any other applicable privilege or doctrine protecting documents from disclosure, HIAMS shall provide a privilege log (“Privilege Log”), describing such Documents in sufficient detail as to explain the nature of the privilege asserted or the basis of any other law or rule protecting such Documents. No Document shall be withheld under claim of privilege if produced or made available to any Government Entity. If any Document protected by the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product protection, or any other privilege is accidentally or inadvertently produced under this Paragraph, its production shall in no way be construed to have waived any privilege or protection attached to such Document. Upon notice by HIAMS of such inadvertent production, the Document shall promptly be destroyed and/or returned to HIAMS.

39. In the event that HIAMS produces Documents or provides declarations or written responses to discovery to any party or non-party in the actions in *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311, concerning or relating to the Actions (“Relevant Production”), HIAMS shall produce all such Documents, declarations or written discovery responses to End-Payor Plaintiffs contemporaneously with making the Relevant Production to the extent such Documents, declarations or written discovery responses have not previously been produced by HIAMS to End-Payor Plaintiffs. This Agreement does not restrict Settlement Class Counsel from attending and/or participating in any depositions in *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-2311. Settlement Class Counsel may attend and/or participate

in any depositions of HIAMS's witnesses in addition to the depositions set forth in Paragraph 40(c), and Settlement Class Counsel together with settlement class counsel for the Automobile Dealership Actions (as defined below) may ask questions for a combined total of three (3) hours at such deposition, provided that the time for participation of Settlement Class Counsel and settlement class counsel for the Automobile Dealerships shall not expand the time permitted for the deposition as may be provided by the Court, and Settlement Class Counsel will not ask the Court to enlarge the time of any deposition noticed of a HIAMS employee.

40. In addition, HIAMS shall provide Cooperation to Settlement Class Counsel as set forth in this Paragraph 40 (a) through (e). All Cooperation shall be coordinated in such a manner so that all unnecessary duplication and expense is avoided. Any Attorney Proffers (as defined below), witness interviews, or depositions provided pursuant to the below obligations, and any request for post-Execution Date transactional data pursuant to Paragraph 37(a), shall be coordinated with, and occur at the same time as, the Attorney Proffers (as defined below), witness interviews, depositions and transactional data production to be provided in a contemporaneous settlement of Master File No. 12-md-02311, Case No. 2:13-cv-00702, Case No. 2:13-cv-01102, Case No. 2:13-cv-01402, Case No. 2:13-cv-01502, Case No. 2:13-cv-01802, Case No. 2:13-cv-02002, Case No. 2:13-cv-02202, Case No. 2:13-cv-02502, and Case No. 2:13-cv-02602 (collectively, "Automobile Dealership Actions"). HIAMS shall make its best efforts (not to include actual or threatened employee disciplinary action) to make available for interviews, depositions, and testimony at trial, or at a mutually agreed-upon location or locations (except for testimony at trial) to the extent relevant laws, regulations and/or government authorities' policy permit up to ten (10) persons for interviews and depositions (as set forth in this Paragraph 40(b) and (c)), and up to ten (10) persons for trial (as set forth in this Paragraph 40(d)) who Settlement

Class Counsel select together with settlement class counsel for the Automobile Dealerships, and which may consist of directors, officers, and/or employees of HIAMS at the time of the specific request pursuant to this Paragraph 40(b), (c) and (d) whom Settlement Class Counsel reasonably and in good faith believe possess knowledge of facts or information that would reasonably assist End-Payor Plaintiffs in the prosecution of the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311. It is understood that HIAMS may be unable to make available for interviews, depositions, or trial testimony or any other court proceedings the six (6) individuals referenced in Paragraph 16(a) of the plea agreement between HIAMS and the United States of America (Case No. 2-13-cr-20707, E.D. Mich., ECF No. 8). To the extent that Settlement Class Counsel and settlement class counsel in the Automobile Dealership Actions cannot agree on the selection of ten (10) persons, Settlement Class Counsel, in consultation with HIAMS, may choose five (5) individuals relating to Released Parts for such interviews and depositions and settlement class counsel in the Automobile Dealership Actions, in consultation with HIAMS, may choose five (5) persons relating to Released Parts for such interviews and depositions. The total number of interviews provided pursuant to this Paragraph 40(b) of this Agreement shall be ten (10), and the total number of depositions provided pursuant to this Paragraph 40(c) of this Agreement shall be ten (10). Settlement Class Counsel may participate in all ten (10) depositions and interviews regardless of the selection process.

(a) Within sixty (60) days of Preliminary Approval of this Agreement, counsel for HIAMS will make themselves available in the United States for up to five (5) meetings of one (1) business day each to provide detailed proffers of the relevant facts known to them relating to End-Payor Plaintiffs' allegations of price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocation related to Released Products ("Attorney Proffers"). As part of the Attorney Proffers, to the extent not

covered by privilege or other protections available under any applicable statute or laws in the United States or any relevant countries, counsel for HIAMS will provide End-Payor Plaintiffs with facts known to them regarding Documents, witnesses, meetings, communications, agreements with competitors, events, background information, and any other relevant topics, relating to the claims at issue in the Actions, with respect to Released Parts including any such information given to the DOJ. Counsel for HIAMS will make themselves available for reasonable follow-up conversations in connection with the Attorney Proffers, and will use reasonable efforts to respond to questions posed by Settlement Class Counsel relating to Released Parts. It is understood that HIAMS has no obligation to seek new or additional information or documents from any of its employees, officers or directors in connection with any of these follow-up conversations or otherwise; however, HIAMS will in good faith consider requests for new or additional information or documents, and will produce such information or documents, if appropriate, in its discretion. End-Payor Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel agree that all Attorney Proffers made by HIAMS's counsel shall be treated as "Highly Confidential," as said designation is described in the Protective Orders that will be issued in the Actions, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the Court, and that they shall not use the information so received for any purpose other than the prosecution of their claims in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement. End-Payor Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel may share information learned in Attorney Proffers with Automobile Dealership Plaintiffs but shall not disclose such information to any other parties including other claimants or potential claimants including direct purchaser plaintiffs, public entity plaintiffs, and opt-out plaintiffs in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311, except with the express written consent of HIAMS. Notwithstanding any other provision of this

Agreement, the parties and their counsel further agree that any Attorney Proffers or other statements made by counsel for HIAMS in connection with or as part of this settlement shall be governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Notwithstanding anything herein, Settlement Class Counsel may use (but shall not introduce an Attorney Proffer into the record, or depose or subpoena any HIAMS counsel related to an Attorney Proffer) information contained in such Attorney Proffers or other statements in the prosecution of its claims in all cases in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311, except any claims against Releasees, and rely on such information to certify that, to the best of Settlement Class Counsel's knowledge, information and belief, such information has evidentiary support or will likely have evidentiary support after reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(b) Upon reasonable notice after Preliminary Approval, HIAMS shall, at Settlement Class Counsel's request, make its best efforts to make available for an interview with Settlement Class Counsel and settlement class counsel in the Automobile Dealership Actions and/or their experts unless otherwise agreed a total of ten (10) persons, including persons relating to Released Parts, who are selected by Settlement Class Counsel, and which may consist of directors, officers, and/or employees of HIAMS at the time of the selection whom the parties reasonably and in good faith believe possess knowledge of facts or information that would reasonably assist End-Payor Plaintiffs in the prosecution of claims for Released Parts in *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311. Interviews shall each be limited to a total of seven (7) hours over one (1) day. To the extent that the person to be interviewed requests an interpreter, interviews shall be limited to a total of twelve (12) hours, which would occur over two (2) consecutive days at the request of the interviewee. Each of the ten (10) persons shall be interviewed only once. Upon reasonable notice by Settlement Class Counsel, HIAMS shall use its

best efforts to make available by telephone the persons who have been interviewed as set forth in this Paragraph 40(b) to answer follow-up questions for a period not to exceed two (2) hours. If any such interview takes place outside of the country of the witness's residence, Settlement Class Counsel shall reimburse HIAMS for such person's economy class fare and \$450 per day for lodging and expenses. If the interview and the below-described deposition occur during the same trip, the above limitations will apply to that trip. Nothing in this provision shall prevent HIAMS from objecting to the reasonableness of the identity and number of persons selected by Settlement Class Counsel and settlement class counsel in the Automobile Dealership Actions to appear for interviews, for depositions, or as trial witnesses.

(c) Upon reasonable notice after Preliminary Approval, HIAMS shall, at Settlement Class Counsel's request, make its best efforts (1) to make available to appear for deposition up to ten (10) persons including persons relating to each of the Actions who Settlement Class Counsel and settlement class counsel in the Automobile Dealership Actions select from among the same ten (10) persons who have been chosen for interviews pursuant to this Paragraph 40 (b), and (2) to provide up to ten (10) declarations/affidavits from the same persons who have been chosen for interviews and depositions pursuant to this Paragraph 40(b) and (c). If HIAMS is unable to make those same persons available for deposition then Settlement Class Counsel may select another person. HIAMS shall use its best efforts to make that person available, and that person would then count towards the ten (10) person deposition limit. Each deposition shall be conducted at a mutually agreed upon location at a mutually agreed upon time and shall each be limited to a total of seven (7) hours over one (1) day. To the extent that the person to be deposed requests an interpreter, the deposition shall be limited to a total of twelve (12) hours, seven (7) of which would occur over two (2) consecutive days at the request of the deponent unless such condition is

inconsistent with the deposition protocol set forth in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311. Written notice by Settlement Class Counsel to HIAMS's counsel shall constitute sufficient service of notice for such depositions. Settlement Class Counsel shall reimburse HIAMS for such deponent's economy class fare and \$450 per day for lodging and expenses. If the deposition and interview occur during the same trip, the above limitations will apply to that trip. Nothing in this provision shall prevent HIAMS from objecting to the reasonableness of the identity and number of persons selected by Settlement Class Counsel and Automobile Dealership settlement class counsel to appear for interviews, for depositions, or as trial witnesses.

(d) Upon reasonable notice, HIAMS shall make reasonable efforts to provide, for trial testimony, if necessary, up to ten (10) persons from among the persons who have been interviewed or deposed pursuant to this Paragraph 40(b) and (c), which may consist of current directors, officers, and/or employees of HIAMS at the time of identification whom the parties reasonably and in good faith believe possess knowledge of facts or information that would reasonably assist End-Payor Plaintiffs in the prosecution of the claims for Released Parts in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311. HIAMS shall not be required to make any individual available to testify more than once in any case. Settlement Class Counsel shall reimburse HIAMS for such witness's economy class fares and \$450 per day for lodging and expenses, but in no event shall Settlement Class Counsel be responsible for reimbursing such persons for time or services rendered. Nothing in this provision shall prevent HIAMS from objecting to the reasonableness of the identity and number of persons selected by Settlement Class Counsel and settlement class counsel for the Automobile Dealership Actions to appear for interviews, for depositions, or as trial witnesses.

(e) In addition to its Cooperation obligations set forth herein, at the request of End-Payor Plaintiffs and subject to meet and confer with HIAMS, HIAMS agrees to produce through affidavit(s) or declaration(s) and/or at trial, if necessary, representatives qualified to authenticate and/or establish as business records any of HIAMS's Documents including transaction and/or cost data produced or to be produced, and to the extent possible, any Documents produced by Defendants or third-parties in the Actions. In addition, if not unduly burdensome, HIAMS agrees to produce through affidavit(s) or declaration(s) and/or at trial, if necessary, representatives qualified to establish any other necessary foundation for admission into evidence. The provisions in this Paragraph 40(e) do not apply to any English Translations or any other translations produced to End-Payor Plaintiffs.

(f) End-Payor Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel agree they will not use the information provided by HIAMS or the Releasees or their representatives under Paragraph 40 for any purpose other than the prosecution of the claims in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md-02311 except for any such claims against HIAMS or the Releasees and will not use it beyond what is reasonably necessary for the prosecution of those claims or as otherwise required by law. All Documents and other information provided pursuant to this Agreement will be deemed "Highly Confidential," as said designation is described in the Protective Orders that will be issued in the Actions, unless otherwise agreed or ordered by the Court.

41. Unless this Agreement is rescinded, disapproved, or otherwise fails to take effect, HIAMS's obligations to provide Cooperation with respect to any Released Product under this Agreement shall continue only until otherwise ordered by the Court, or the date that final judgment has been entered in the Actions against all Defendants.

42. If this Agreement is rescinded, disapproved, otherwise fails to take effect, or if final judgment has been entered in the Actions against All Defendants (collectively “Final Termination”), unless otherwise agreed by HIAMS, within sixty (60) days after Final Termination, End-Payor Plaintiffs must return all Cooperation Materials received from HIAMS including all copies, abstracts, compilations, summaries or any other form that reproduces or captures any of the Cooperation Materials. With permission in writing from HIAMS, End-Payor Plaintiffs may destroy some or all of the Cooperation Materials instead of returning them. Whether the Cooperation Materials are returned or destroyed, End-Payor Plaintiffs must submit a written certification to HIAMS by the sixty (60) day deadline that identifies (by category, where appropriate) all Cooperation Materials that were returned or destroyed and that affirms that End-Payor Plaintiffs have not retained any copies, abstracts, compilations, summaries or other form that reproduces or captures any of the Cooperation Materials.

43. In the event that this Agreement fails to receive Final Court Approval by the Court as contemplated in Paragraphs 19 - 24 hereof, including final approval of “the Settlement Classes” as defined in Paragraph 14, or in the event that it is terminated by either party under any provision herein, the parties agree that neither End-Payor Plaintiffs nor Settlement Class Counsel shall be permitted to use or introduce into evidence against HIAMS and other Releasees, at any hearing or trial, or in support of any motion, opposition or other pleading in the Actions or in any other federal or state or foreign action alleging a violation of any law relating to the subject matter of the Actions, any deposition testimony or any Documents provided by HIAMS and/or the Releasees, their counsel, or any individual made available by HIAMS pursuant to Cooperation (as opposed to from any other source or pursuant to a court order). Notwithstanding anything contained herein, End-Payor Plaintiffs and the Settlement Classes are not relinquishing any rights to pursue

discovery against HIAMS and other Releasees in the event that this Agreement fails to receive Final Court Approval in each Action as contemplated in Paragraphs 19 - 24 hereof, including final approval of the "Settlement Classes" as defined in Paragraph 14, or in the event that it is terminated by either party under any provision herein.

44. HIAMS and other Releasees need not respond to formal discovery requests from End-Payor Plaintiffs or otherwise participate in the Actions during the pendency of this Agreement, with the exception of the Cooperation provisions set forth above. Other than to enforce the terms of this Agreement, neither HIAMS nor End-Payor Plaintiffs shall file motions against the other, in the Actions, during the pendency of this Agreement.

45. HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs agree not to disclose publicly or to any other person, except for Releasees where necessary, the terms of this Agreement until this Agreement is submitted to the Court for Preliminary Approval.

46. If Settlement Class Counsel believes that any current employee, officer, or director of HIAMS has refused to cooperate under the terms of this Agreement, Settlement Class Counsel may seek an Order from the Court compelling such a current employee, officer or director of HIAMS to provide discovery. Any court order may not infringe on a witness's applicable constitutional or legal rights against self-incrimination.

K. Rescission if this Agreement Is Not Approved or Final Judgments Are Not Entered

47. If the Court refuses to approve this Agreement or any part hereof, including if the Court does not certify Settlement Class(es) in accordance with the specific settlement class definitions set forth in this Agreement at Paragraph 14, or if such approval is modified or set aside on appeal, or if the Court does not enter the final judgments provided for in Paragraph 23 of this

Agreement, or if the Court enters the final judgments and appellate review is sought, and on such review, such final judgments are not affirmed in its entirety, then HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs shall each, in their sole discretion, have the option to rescind this Agreement in its entirety. Written notice of the exercise of any such right to rescind shall be made according to the terms of Paragraph 57. A modification or reversal on appeal of any amount of Settlement Class Counsel's fees and expenses awarded by the Court from any of the Settlement Amount shall not be deemed a modification of all or a part of the terms of this Agreement or such final judgment.

48. In the event that this Agreement does not become final, or this Agreement otherwise is terminated by either party under any provision herein then: (1) this Agreement shall be of no force or effect; (2) any and all parts of the Settlement Amount caused to be deposited in the Escrow Account(s) (including interest earned thereon) shall be returned forthwith to HIAMS less only disbursements made in accordance with Paragraph 30 of this Agreement; and (3) HIAMS shall be entitled to any tax refunds owing to the Settlement Amount. At the request of HIAMS, the Tax Administrator shall file claims for any tax refunds owed to the Settlement Amount and pay the proceeds, after deduction of any fees and expenses incurred with filing such claims for tax refunds, to HIAMS. HIAMS expressly reserves all of their rights and defenses if this Agreement does not become final.

49. Further, and in any event, End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS agree that this Agreement, whether or not it shall become final, and any and all negotiations, Documents, and discussions associated with it, shall not be deemed or construed to be an admission or evidence of any violation of any statute or law or of any liability or wrongdoing whatsoever by HIAMS, or the Releasees, to be used against HIAMS and other Releasees (except to enforce this Agreement), or of the truth of any of the claims or allegations contained in the Complaints or any other pleading

filed in the Actions, or by any person or entity in any other action, to be used against HIAMS and other Releasees and evidence thereof shall not be discoverable or used in any way, whether in the Actions or in any other action or proceeding, against HIAMS and other Releasees. Nothing in this Paragraph shall prevent End-Payor Plaintiffs from using Cooperation Materials produced pursuant to Paragraphs 35 - 46, subject to the limitations in those paragraphs, for the purpose of prosecution of the claims in the *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation*, Master File No. 12-md- 02311, except as to any such claims against HIAMS or Releasees.

50. This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is to provide, through this Agreement, for a complete resolution of the relevant claims with respect to each Releasee as provided in this Agreement as well as cooperation by HIAMS.

51. The parties to this Agreement contemplate and agree that, prior to final approval of the settlement as provided for in Paragraphs 19 - 24 hereof, appropriate notice (1) of the settlement; and (2) of a hearing at which the Court will consider the approval of this Agreement, will be given to Settlement Classes.

L. Miscellaneous

52. HIAMS shall submit all materials required to be sent to appropriate Federal and State officials pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1715.

53. This Agreement does not settle or compromise any claim by End-Payor Plaintiffs or any Settlement Class Member asserted in the Complaints or, if amended, any subsequent Complaints, against any Defendant or alleged co-conspirator other than the Releasees. All rights against such other defendants or alleged co-conspirators are specifically reserved by End-Payor

Plaintiffs and the Settlement Classes. All rights of any Settlement Class Member against any and all former, current, or future Defendants or co-conspirators or any other person other than the Releasees, for sales made by the HIAMS Defendants and the HIAMS Defendants' alleged illegal conduct are specifically reserved by End-Payor Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members. HIAMS Defendants' sales to the Settlement Classes and the HIAMS Defendants' alleged illegal conduct shall remain in the Actions as a potential basis for damage claims and shall be part of any joint and several liability claims against other current or future Defendants in the Actions or other persons or entities other than the Releasees.

54. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan shall retain jurisdiction over the implementation, enforcement, and performance of this Agreement, and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any suit, action, proceeding, or dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the applicability of this Agreement that cannot be resolved by negotiation and agreement by End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS. This Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted according to the substantive laws of the State of Michigan without regard to its choice of law or conflict of laws principles. HIAMS will not object to complying with any of the provisions outlined in this Agreement on the basis of jurisdiction.

55. This Agreement constitutes the entire, complete and integrated agreement among End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS pertaining to the settlement of the Actions against the HIAMS Defendants, and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous undertakings, communications, representations, understandings, negotiations and discussions, either oral or written, between End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS in connection herewith. This Agreement may not be modified or amended except in writing executed by End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS, and approved by the Court.

56. This Agreement shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the successors and assigns of End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, each and every covenant and agreement made herein by End-Payor Plaintiffs or Settlement Class Counsel shall be binding upon all Settlement Class Members and Releasers. The Releasees other than HIAMS that are parties hereto are third-party beneficiaries of this Agreement and are authorized to enforce its terms applicable to them. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts by End-Payor Plaintiffs and HIAMS, and a facsimile signature shall be deemed an original signature for purposes of executing this Agreement.

57. Neither End-Payor Plaintiffs nor HIAMS shall be considered to be the drafter of this Agreement or any of its provisions for the purpose of any statute, case law, or rule of interpretation or construction that would or might cause any provision to be construed against the drafter of this Agreement.

58. Where this Agreement requires either party to provide notice or any other communication or document to the other, such notice shall be in writing, and such notice, communication, or document shall be provided by facsimile, or electronic mail, or letter by

overnight delivery to the undersigned counsel of record for the party to whom notice is being provided.

59. Each of the undersigned attorneys represents that he or she is fully authorized to enter into the terms and conditions of, and to execute, this Agreement, subject to Court approval.

Dated: March 26, 2015



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
)
 v.)
)
 HITACHI AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS, LTD.,)
)
 Defendant.)

Criminal No. 13-20707
Filed:
Violation: 15 U.S.C. § 1

FILED
NOV - 6 2013
CLERK'S OFFICE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN MICHIGAN

PLEA AGREEMENT

The United States of America and Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd. ("defendant"), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Japan, hereby enter into the following Plea Agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Fed. R. Crim. P."):

RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT

1. The defendant understands its rights:
 - (a) to be represented by an attorney;
 - (b) to be charged by Indictment;
 - (c) as a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Japan, to decline to accept service of the Summons in this case, and to contest the jurisdiction of the United States to prosecute this case against it in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan;
 - (d) to plead not guilty to any criminal charge brought against it;
 - (e) to have a trial by jury, at which it would be presumed not guilty of the charge and the United States would have to prove every essential element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt for it to be found guilty;

- (f) to confront and cross-examine witnesses against it and to subpoena witnesses in its defense at trial;
- (g) to appeal its conviction if it is found guilty; and
- (h) to appeal the imposition of sentence against it.

**AGREEMENT TO PLEAD GUILTY
AND WAIVE CERTAIN RIGHTS**

2. The defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the rights set out in Paragraph 1(b)-(g) above. The defendant also knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to file any appeal, any collateral attack, or any other writ or motion, including but not limited to an appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, that challenges the sentence imposed by the Court if that sentence is consistent with or below the recommended sentence in Paragraph 9 of this Plea Agreement, regardless of how the sentence is determined by the Court. This agreement does not affect the rights or obligations of the United States as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)-(c). Nothing in this paragraph, however, will act as a bar to the defendant perfecting any legal remedies it may otherwise have on appeal or collateral attack respecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. The defendant agrees that there is currently no known evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b), the defendant will waive indictment and plead guilty to a one-count Information to be filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Information will charge the defendant with participating in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition in the automotive parts industry by agreeing to allocate the supply of, rig bids for, and fix, stabilize, and maintain the prices of, certain automotive products sold to automobile manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere, from at least as early as January 2000 until at least February 2010, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. For the purposes of this Plea Agreement, “automotive parts” are defined as starter motors,

alternators, air flow meters, valve timing control devices, fuel injection systems, electronic throttle bodies, ignition coils, inverters and motor generators.

3. The defendant will plead guilty to the criminal charge described in Paragraph 2 above pursuant to the terms of this Plea Agreement and will make a factual admission of guilt to the Court in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, as set forth in Paragraph 4 below.

FACTUAL BASIS FOR OFFENSE CHARGED

4. Had this case gone to trial, the United States would have presented evidence sufficient to prove the following facts:

(a) For purposes of this Plea Agreement, the “relevant period” is that period from at least as early as January 2000 until at least February 2010. The defendant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Japan. The defendant has its principal place of business in Tokyo, Japan. During the relevant period, the defendant and/or certain related entities as defined in paragraph 13 was a manufacturer of various automotive parts as defined in paragraph 2. The defendant was engaged in the sale of these automotive parts in the United States and elsewhere, and employed 5,000 or more individuals. Starter motors are small electric motors used in starting internal combustion engines. Alternators are electromechanical devices that generate an electric current while engines are in operation. Air flow meters measure the volume of air flowing into engines. Valve timing control devices control the timing of engine valves’ operation, and include the VTC actuator and/or solenoid valve. Fuel injection systems admit fuel or a fuel/air mixture into engine cylinders, and may include injectors, high pressure pumps, rail assemblies, feed lines and other components sold as a unitary system. Fuel injection systems can also be sold as part of a broader system, such as an engine management system, or as separate components, such as the injectors, feed lines, high pressure pumps, and/or rail assemblies. Electronic throttle bodies control the amount of air flowing into engines. Ignition coils release electric energy to ignite the fuel/air mixture in cylinders.

Inverters convert direct current electricity to alternating current. Motor generators are electric motors used to power electric drive systems that can also capture energy from the process of stopping a vehicle to generate electricity through regenerative braking. During the relevant period, the defendant's and its related entities' sales of starter motors to General Motors Company ("GM") and Nissan Motor Company, Ltd. ("Nissan"); alternators to Nissan; air flow meters to Nissan, Toyota Motor Corporation ("Toyota") and Honda Motor Company, Ltd., ("Honda"); valve timing control devices to Ford Motor Company ("Ford"); fuel injection systems to GM and Nissan; electronic throttle bodies to GM and Nissan; and ignition coils to Honda, together with sales to certain of their subsidiaries, affiliates and suppliers in the United States and elsewhere totaled more than \$650 million.

(b) During the relevant period, the defendant, through its officers and employees, including high-level personnel of the defendant, participated in a conspiracy among major automotive parts manufacturers, the primary purpose of which was to allocate the supply of, rig bids for, and fix, stabilize and maintain the prices of, starter motors, alternators, air flow meters, valve timing control devices, fuel injection systems, electronic throttle bodies, ignition coils, inverters and motor generators sold to, depending on the product, Nissan, Honda, GM, Ford, Toyota, Chrysler Group LLC, Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd. and others, and certain of their subsidiaries, affiliates and suppliers in the United States and elsewhere. In furtherance of the conspiracy, the defendant, through its officers and employees, engaged in discussions and attended meetings with representatives of other major automotive parts manufacturers. During these discussions and meetings, agreements were reached to allocate the supply of the aforementioned automotive parts sold to automobile manufacturers, rig bids quoted to automobile manufacturers for the aforementioned automotive parts, and to fix, stabilize, and maintain the prices, including coordinating price adjustments requested by automobile

manufacturers, of the aforementioned automotive parts sold to automobile manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere.

(c) During the relevant period, certain automotive parts sold by one or more of the conspirator firms, and equipment and supplies necessary to the production and distribution of automotive parts, as well as payments for automotive parts, traveled in interstate commerce and foreign commerce as imports into the United States. The business activities of the defendant and its co-conspirators in connection with the production and sale of automotive parts that were the subjects of this conspiracy were within the flow of, and substantially affected, interstate and foreign trade and commerce.

(d) The conspiratorial meetings and discussions described above took place in the United States and elsewhere, and automotive parts that were the subject of the conspiracy were sold to Nissan, Honda, GM, Ford, Toyota, and others, and certain of their subsidiaries, affiliates and suppliers in the U.S. and elsewhere, by the defendant's affiliate, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., which is located in the Eastern District of Michigan.

(e) In February 2010, certain employees of the defendant became aware of a criminal antitrust investigation when one of their co-conspirators in the criminal activity described in paragraphs 4(a) – (d) of this Plea Agreement was searched by Federal law enforcement authorities in the United States. Over the next several days, certain employees of the defendant took steps to destroy evidence of the defendant's criminal activity described in paragraphs 4(a) – (d). In July 2011, certain employees of the defendant learned that the defendant was being raided by law enforcement authorities outside the United States in connection with an investigation into violations of competition laws. Immediately after learning of the search, certain employees of the defendant took steps to destroy evidence of the criminal activity described in paragraphs 4(a) – (d) to prevent its discovery by law enforcement authorities. On both occasions, the

evidence that was destroyed included electronic files and paper documents. Certain employees involved in the efforts to destroy evidence were senior managers of the defendant.

ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE

5. The elements of the charged offense are that:
- (a) the conspiracy described in the Information existed at or about the time alleged;
 - (b) the defendant knowingly became a member of the conspiracy; and
 - (c) the conspiracy described in the Information either substantially affected interstate commerce in goods or services or occurred within the flow of interstate commerce in goods and services.

POSSIBLE MAXIMUM SENTENCE

6. The defendant understands that the statutory maximum penalty which may be imposed against it upon conviction for a violation of Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act is a fine in an amount equal to the greatest of:

- (a) \$100 million (15 U.S.C. § 1);
- (b) twice the gross pecuniary gain the conspirators derived from the crime (18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) and (d)); or
- (c) twice the gross pecuniary loss caused to the victims of the crime by the conspirators (18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) and (d)).

7. In addition, the defendant understands that:

- (a) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3561(c)(1), the Court may impose a term of probation of at least one year, but not more than five years;

(b) pursuant to §8B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.,” “Sentencing Guidelines,” or “Guidelines”) or 18 U.S.C. §3563(b)(2) or 3663(a)(3), the Court may order it to pay restitution to the victims of the offense; and

(c) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(B), the Court is required to order the defendant to pay a \$400 special assessment upon conviction for the charged crime.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

8. The defendant understands that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, but that the Court must consider, in determining and imposing sentence, the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date of sentencing unless that Manual provides for greater punishment than the Manual in effect on the last date that the offense of conviction was committed, in which case the Court must consider the Guidelines Manual in effect on the last date that the offense of conviction was committed. The parties agree there is no ex post facto issue under the November, 2012 Guidelines Manual. The Court must also consider the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining and imposing sentence. The defendant understands that the Guidelines determinations will be made by the Court by a preponderance of the evidence standard. The defendant understands that although the Court is not ultimately bound to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range, its sentence must be reasonable based upon consideration of all relevant sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

SENTENCING AGREEMENT

9. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) and subject to the full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of the defendant and related entities, as defined in Paragraph 13 of this Plea Agreement, the United States and the defendant agree that the appropriate disposition of this case is, and agree to recommend jointly that the Court impose, a sentence requiring the defendant to pay to the United States a criminal fine of \$195 million, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3571(d),

payable in full before the fifteenth (15th) day after the date of judgment, and no order of restitution (“the recommended sentence”). The parties agree that there exists no aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the U.S. Sentencing Commission in formulating the Sentencing Guidelines justifying a departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. §5K2.0. The parties agree not to seek at the sentencing hearing any sentence outside of the Guidelines range nor any Guidelines adjustment for any reason that is not set forth in this Plea Agreement. The parties further agree that the recommended sentence set forth in this Plea Agreement is reasonable.

(a) The defendant understands that the Court will order it to pay a \$400 special assessment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(B), in addition to any fine imposed.

(b) In light of the availability of civil causes of action, which potentially provide for a recovery of a multiple of actual damages, the recommended sentence does not include a restitution order for the offense charged in the Information.

(c) Both parties will recommend that no term of probation be imposed, but the defendant understands that the Court’s denial of this request will not void this Plea Agreement.

(d) The United States and the defendant jointly submit that this Plea Agreement, together with the record that will be created by the United States and the defendant at the plea and sentencing hearings, and the further disclosure described in Paragraph 11, will provide sufficient information concerning the defendant, the crime charged in this case, and the defendant’s role in the crime to enable the meaningful exercise of sentencing authority by the Court under 18 U.S.C. § 3553. The United States and defendant agree to request jointly that the Court accept the defendant’s guilty plea and impose sentence on an expedited schedule as early as the date of arraignment, based upon the record provided by the defendant and the United States, under the provisions of

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1)(A)(ii), U.S.S.G. §6A1.1, and Rule 32.1(h) of the Criminal Local Rules. The Court's denial of the request to impose sentence on an expedited schedule will not void this Plea Agreement.

(e) The United States contends that had this case gone to trial, the United States would have presented evidence to prove that the gain derived from or the loss resulting from the charged offense is sufficient to justify the recommended sentence set forth in this paragraph, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d). For purposes of this plea and sentencing only, the defendant waives its rights to contest this calculation.

10. The United States and the defendant agree that the applicable Guidelines fine range exceeds the fine contained in the recommended sentence set out in Paragraph 9 above. Subject to the full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of the defendant and its related entities, as defined in Paragraph 13 of this Plea Agreement, and prior to sentencing in this case, the United States agrees that it will make a motion, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §8C4.1, for a downward departure from the Guidelines fine range and will request that the Court impose the recommended sentence set out in Paragraph 9 of this Plea Agreement because of the defendant's and its related entities' substantial assistance in the government's investigation and prosecutions of violations of federal criminal law in the automotive parts industry.

11. Subject to the full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of the defendant and its related entities, as defined in Paragraph 13 of this Plea Agreement, and prior to sentencing in this case, the United States will fully advise the Court and the Probation Office of the fact, manner, and extent of the defendant's and its related entities' cooperation, and their commitment to prospective cooperation, with the United States' investigation and prosecutions, all material facts relating to the defendant's involvement in the charged offense, and all other relevant conduct.

12. The United States and the defendant understand that the Court retains complete discretion to accept or reject the recommended sentence provided for in Paragraph 9 of this Plea Agreement.

(a) If the Court does not accept the recommended sentence, the United States and the defendant agree that this Plea Agreement, except for Paragraph 12(b) below, will be rendered void.

(b) If the Court does not accept the recommended sentence, the defendant will be free to withdraw its guilty plea (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5) and (d)). If the defendant withdraws its plea of guilty, this Plea Agreement, the guilty plea, and any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 regarding the guilty plea or this Plea Agreement or made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the government will not be admissible against the defendant in any criminal or civil proceeding, except as otherwise provided in Fed. R. Evid. 410. In addition, the defendant agrees that, if it withdraws its guilty plea pursuant to this subparagraph of this Plea Agreement, the statute of limitations period for any offense referred to in Paragraph 15 of this Plea Agreement will be tolled for the period between the date of the signing of this Plea Agreement and the date the defendant withdrew its guilty plea or for a period of sixty (60) days after the date of the signing of this Plea Agreement, whichever period is greater.

DEFENDANT'S COOPERATION

13. The defendant and its related entities will cooperate fully and truthfully with the United States in the prosecution of this case, the current federal investigation of violations of federal antitrust and related criminal laws involving the manufacture or sale of automotive parts as defined in paragraph 2 of this Plea Agreement, as well as automotive engine control units, automotive transmission control units, and automotive sensors, and any litigation or other proceedings arising or resulting from that investigation to which the United States is a party (collectively, "Federal Proceeding"). Federal Proceeding includes, but is not limited to, an investigation, prosecution, litigation, or other proceeding regarding obstruction of, the making of a false statement or declaration in, the commission of perjury or subornation of perjury in, the

commission of contempt in, or conspiracy to commit such offenses in, a Federal Proceeding. The defendant's related entities for purposes of this Plea Agreement are its affiliate Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., the former Hitachi Automotive Systems Group of Hitachi, Ltd., as it existed prior to July 1, 2009, the former Hitachi Unisia Automotive, Ltd., the former Tokico, Ltd., and entities engaged in the manufacture or sale of automotive parts, automotive engine control units, automotive transmission control units, or automotive sensors that the defendant or Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc. had a greater than 50% ownership interest in as of the date of signature of this Plea Agreement. The full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of the defendant and its related entities will include, but not be limited to:

(a) producing to the United States all documents, information, and other materials, wherever located, not protected under the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine (and with translations into English), in the possession, custody, or control of the defendant or any of its related entities, requested by the United States in connection with any Federal Proceeding;

(b) using its best efforts to secure the full, truthful, and continuing cooperation, as defined in Paragraph 14 of this Plea Agreement, of the current and former directors, officers, and employees of the defendant or any of its related entities as may be requested by the United States, but excluding the 6 individuals listed in Attachment A (filed under seal), including making these persons available in the United States and at other mutually agreed-upon locations, at the defendant's expense, for interviews and the provision of testimony in grand jury, trial, and other judicial proceedings in connection with any Federal Proceeding. Current directors, officers, and employees are defined for purposes of this Plea Agreement as individuals who are directors, officers, or employees of the defendant or any of its related entities as of the date of signature of this Plea Agreement.

14. The full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of each person described in Paragraph 13(b) above will be subject to the procedures and protections of this paragraph, and will include, but not be limited to:

(a) producing in the United States and at other mutually agreed-upon locations all documents, including claimed personal documents and other materials, wherever located not protected under the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine (and with translations into English), that are requested by attorneys and agents of the United States in connection with any Federal Proceeding;

(b) making himself or herself available for interviews in the United States and at other mutually agreed-upon locations, not at the expense of the United States, upon the request of attorneys and agents of the United States in connection with any Federal Proceeding;

(c) responding fully and truthfully to all inquiries of the United States in connection with any Federal Proceeding, without falsely implicating any person or intentionally withholding any information, subject to the penalties of making false statements or declarations (18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1623), obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503, *et seq.*), or conspiracy to commit such offenses;

(d) otherwise voluntarily providing the United States with any material or information not requested in (a) - (c) of this paragraph and not protected under the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine that he or she may have that is related to any Federal Proceeding;

(e) when called upon to do so by the United States in connection with any Federal Proceeding, testifying in grand jury, trial, and other judicial proceedings in the United States fully, truthfully, and under oath, subject to the penalties of perjury (18 U.S.C. § 1621), making false statements or declarations in grand jury or court

proceedings (18 U.S.C. § 1623), contempt (18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402), and obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503, *et seq.*); and

(f) agreeing that, if the agreement not to prosecute him or her in this Plea Agreement is rendered void under Paragraph 16(c), the statute of limitations period for any Relevant Offense, as defined in Paragraph 16(a), will be tolled as to him or her for the period between the date of the signing of this Plea Agreement and six (6) months after the date that the United States gave notice of its intent to void its obligations to that person under this Plea Agreement.

GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT

15. Subject to the full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of the defendant and its related entities, as defined in Paragraph 13 of this Plea Agreement, and upon the Court's acceptance of the guilty plea called for by this Plea Agreement and the imposition of the recommended sentence, the United States agrees that it will not bring further criminal charges against the defendant or any of its related entities for any act or offense committed before the date of signature of this Plea Agreement that (a) was undertaken in furtherance of an antitrust conspiracy involving the manufacture or sale of automotive parts as defined in paragraph 2 of this Plea Agreement, automotive engine control units, automotive transmission control units, or automotive sensors, or (b) is specified in Paragraph 4(e). The nonprosecution terms of this paragraph do not apply to (a) any acts of subornation of perjury (18 U.S.C. § 1622), making a false statement (18 U.S.C. § 1001), obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503, *et seq.*), contempt (18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402), or conspiracy to commit such offenses, except for the conduct specified in Paragraph 4(e) of this Plea Agreement; (b) civil matters of any kind; (c) any violation of the

federal tax or securities laws or conspiracy to commit such offenses; or (d) any crime of violence.

16. The United States agrees to the following:

(a) Upon the Court's acceptance of the guilty plea called for by this Plea Agreement and the imposition of the recommended sentence and subject to the exceptions noted in Paragraph 16(c), the United States will not bring criminal charges against any current or former director, officer, or employee of the defendant or its related entities for any act or offense committed before the date of signature of this Plea Agreement and while that person was acting as a director, officer, or employee of the defendant or its related entities that was undertaken in furtherance of an antitrust conspiracy involving the manufacture or sale of the automotive parts as defined in Paragraph 2, automotive engine control units, automotive transmission control units, or automotive sensors ("Relevant Offense"), except that the protections granted in this paragraph do not apply to the 6 individuals listed in Attachment A filed under seal;

(b) Should the United States determine that any current or former director, officer, or employee of the defendant or its related entities may have information relevant to any Federal Proceeding, the United States may request that person's cooperation under the terms of this Plea Agreement by written request delivered to counsel for the individual (with a copy to the undersigned counsel for the defendant) or, if the individual is not known by the United States to be represented, to the undersigned counsel for the defendant;

(c) If any person requested to provide cooperation under Paragraph 16(b) fails to comply with his or her obligations under Paragraph 14, then the terms of this Plea

Agreement as they pertain to that person and the agreement not to prosecute that person granted in this Plea Agreement will be rendered void, and the United States may prosecute such person criminally for any federal crime of which the United States has knowledge, including, but not limited to any Relevant Offense;

(d) Except as provided in Paragraph 16(e), information provided by a person described in Paragraph 16(b) to the United States under the terms of this Plea Agreement pertaining to any Relevant Offense, or any information directly or indirectly derived from that information, may not be used against that person in a criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury or subornation of perjury (18 U.S.C. §§ 1621-22), making a false statement or declaration (18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1623), obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503, *et seq.*), contempt (18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402), or conspiracy to commit such offenses;

(e) If any person who provides information to the United States under this Plea Agreement fails to comply fully with his or her obligations under Paragraph 14 of this Plea Agreement, the agreement in Paragraph 16(d) not to use that information or any information directly or indirectly derived from it against that person in a criminal case will be rendered void;

(f) The nonprosecution terms of this paragraph do not apply to civil matters of any kind; any violation of the federal tax or securities laws or conspiracy to commit such offenses; any crime of violence; or perjury or subornation of perjury (18 U.S.C. §§ 1621-22), making a false statement or declaration (18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1623), obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503, *et seq.*), contempt (18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402), or conspiracy to commit such offenses; and

(g) Documents provided under Paragraphs 13(a) and 14(a) will be deemed responsive to outstanding grand jury subpoenas issued to the defendant or any of its related entities.

17. The United States agrees that when any person travels to the United States for interviews, grand jury appearances, or court appearances pursuant to this Plea Agreement, or for meetings with counsel in preparation therefor, the United States will take no action, based upon any Relevant Offense, to subject such person to arrest, detention, or service of process, or to prevent such person from departing the United States. This paragraph does not apply to an individual's commission of perjury or subornation of perjury (18 U.S.C. §§ 1621-22), making false statements or declarations (18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1623), obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503, *et seq.*), contempt (18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402), or conspiracy to commit such offenses in connection with any testimony or information provided or requested in any Federal Proceeding.

REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL

18. The defendant has been represented by counsel and is fully satisfied that its attorneys have provided competent legal representation. The defendant has thoroughly reviewed this Plea Agreement and acknowledges that counsel has advised it of the nature of the charge, any possible defenses to the charge, and the nature and range of possible sentences.

VOLUNTARY PLEA

19. The defendant's decision to enter into this Plea Agreement and to tender a plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and is not the result of force, threats, assurances, promises, or representations other than the representations contained in this Plea Agreement and Attachment A. The United States has made no promises or representations to the defendant as to

whether the Court will accept or reject the recommendations contained within this Plea Agreement.

VIOLATION OF PLEA AGREEMENT

20. The defendant agrees that, should the United States determine in good faith, during the period that any Federal Proceeding is pending, that the defendant or any of its related entities have failed to provide full, truthful, and continuing cooperation, as defined in Paragraph 13 of this Plea Agreement, or have otherwise violated any provision of this Plea Agreement, the United States will notify counsel for the defendant in writing by personal or overnight delivery, email, or facsimile transmission and may also notify counsel by telephone of its intention to void any of its obligations under this Plea Agreement (except its obligations under this paragraph), and the defendant and its related entities will be subject to prosecution for any federal crime of which the United States has knowledge including, but not limited to, the substantive offenses relating to the investigation resulting in this Plea Agreement. The defendant agrees that, in the event that the United States is released from its obligations under this Plea Agreement and brings criminal charges against the defendant or its related entities for any offense referred to in Paragraph 15 of this Plea Agreement, the statute of limitations period for such offense will be tolled for the period between the date of the signing of this Plea Agreement and six (6) months after the date the United States gave notice of its intent to void its obligations under this Plea Agreement.

21. The defendant understands and agrees that in any further prosecution of it or its related entities resulting from the release of the United States from its obligations under this Plea Agreement, because of the defendant's or its related entities' violation of this Plea Agreement, any documents, statements, information, testimony, or evidence provided by it,

its related entities, or current or former directors, officers, or employees of it or its related entities to attorneys or agents of the United States, federal grand juries, or courts, and any leads derived therefrom, may be used against it or its related entities. In addition, the defendant unconditionally waives its right to challenge the use of such evidence in any such further prosecution, notwithstanding the protections of Fed. R. Evid. 410.

ENTIRETY OF AGREEMENT

22. This Plea Agreement and Attachment A constitute the entire agreement between the United States and the defendant concerning the disposition of the criminal charge in this case. This Plea Agreement cannot be modified except in writing, signed by the United States and the defendant.

23. The undersigned is authorized to enter this Plea Agreement on behalf of the defendant as evidenced by the Resolution of the Board of Directors of the defendant attached to, and incorporated by reference in, this Plea Agreement.

24. The undersigned attorneys for the United States have been authorized by the Attorney General of the United States to enter this Plea Agreement on behalf of the United States.

25. A facsimile or PDF signature will be deemed an original signature for the purpose of executing this Plea Agreement. Multiple signature pages are authorized for the purpose of executing this Plea Agreement.

DATED: Sep. 25. 2013

Respectfully submitted,

BY: Koji Yamanokawa
Koji Yamanokawa
Senior Vice President, Board Director,
And Chief Compliance Officer
Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd.

BY: Mark C. Grundvig
Mark C. Grundvig
Kenneth W. Gaul
Jason D. Jones
Nikhil Pyati
Megan E. Gerking

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Counsel for Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd.

**Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd.
BOARD RESOLUTION**

At the meeting of the Board of Directors of Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd. ("HIAMS") held on September 25, 2013, the Board:

RESOLVED, that the execution, delivery and performance of the Plea Agreement between the United States Department of Justice and HIAMS, in the form attached hereto, is hereby approved;

RESOLVED, that Mr. Koji Yamanokawa, Senior Vice President, Board Director and Chief Compliance Officer of HIAMS, is authorized, empowered, and directed to execute and deliver the Plea Agreement in the name and on behalf of HIAMS; and

RESOLVED, that Mr. Koji Yamanokawa is authorized, empowered, and directed to represent HIAMS before any court or governmental agency in order to make statements and confirmations in accordance with the Plea Agreement, including entering a guilty plea on behalf of HIAMS.

CERTIFICATION

I, Hiroshi Sato, President and Chief Operating Officer of Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd. ("HIAMS"), a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan, do hereby certify that the foregoing resolutions adopted by the Board of Directors of HIAMS at a meeting of the Board of Directors held in Tokyo, Japan on September 25, 2013, and in accordance with its Articles of Incorporation, are true and correct and complete and that said resolutions have not been amended, modified or repealed, and remain in full force and effect, as of the date hereof.

Signed in Tokyo, Japan this 25th day of September, 2013 by:



Hiroshi Sato
President and Chief Operating Officer
Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd.

Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement

3. The terms of the Settlement Agreement are hereby preliminarily approved, including the release contained therein, as being fair, reasonable, and adequate to the Settlement Classes, subject to a Fairness Hearing. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement was entered into at arm's length by experienced counsel and is sufficiently within the range of reasonableness that notice of the Settlement Agreement should be given, pursuant to a plan to be submitted by Settlement Class Counsel and approved by the Court at a later date as provided in this Order.

Class Certification

4. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 23, and in light of the proposed settlement, the Court hereby finds that the prerequisites for a class action have been met and provisionally certifies the following classes for settlement purposes ("Settlement Classes"):

a. "Alternators Settlement Class" is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Alternators in the United States, not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Alternators directly or for resale.

b. "Starters Settlement Class" is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Starters in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities

of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Starters directly or for resale.

c. “Ignition Coils Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Ignition Coils in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Ignition Coils directly or for resale.

d. “Motor Generators Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Motor Generators in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Motor Generators directly or for resale.

e. “Inverters Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Inverters in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Inverters directly or for resale.

f. “Fuel Injection Systems Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Fuel Injection Systems in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies

and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Fuel Injection Systems directly or for resale.

g. “Valve Timing Control Devices Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Valve Control Timing Devices in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Valve Timing Control Devices directly or for resale.

h. “Air Flow Meters Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Air Flow Meters in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Air Flow Meters directly or for resale.

i. “Electronic Throttle Bodies Settlement Class” is defined as:

All persons and entities from January 1, 2000, through the Execution Date of this Agreement between HIAMS and End-Payor Plaintiffs who: indirectly purchased and/or leased one or more Electronic Throttle Bodies in the United States not for resale (i) as a component in a new vehicle or (ii) as a stand-alone product. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, and persons who purchased Electronic Throttle Bodies directly or for resale.

5. The Court finds that provisional certification of the Settlement Classes is warranted in light of the Settlement Agreement because: (a) the Settlement Classes are so numerous that joinder is impracticable; (b) End-Payor Plaintiffs’ claims present common issues and are typical of the Settlement Classes; (c) End-Payor Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel

(defined below) will fairly and adequately represent the Settlement Classes; and (d) common issues predominate over any individual issues affecting the members of the Settlement Classes. The Court further finds that End-Payor Plaintiffs' interests are aligned with the interests of all other members of the Settlement Classes. The Court also finds settlement of this action on a class basis superior to other means of resolving the matter.

Appointment of Settlement Class Counsel

6. The Court hereby appoints Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy LLP, Robins Kaplan LLP, and Susman Godfrey L.L.P. as Settlement Class Counsel, having determined that the requirements of Rule 23(g) are fully satisfied by this appointment.

7. Each End-Payor Plaintiff class representative named in the Complaint will serve as End-Payor Plaintiff class representative on behalf of the Settlement Classes.

Notice to Potential Class Members

1. Prior to the Fairness Hearing, Settlement Class Counsel shall provide notice of the Settlement Agreement and the Fairness Hearing to all persons affected by and/or entitled to participate in the Settlement Agreement in compliance with the notice requirements of Rule 23 and due process of law. Such means of providing notice will be addressed in a subsequent Order following submission by End-Payor Plaintiffs at a later date of a proposal for notice to the Settlement Classes and related forms for notice, claims and distribution ("Notice Motion").

2. The Notice Motion shall include a proposed form of, method for, and date of dissemination of notice and the date on which the notice is mailed shall be the "Notice Date."

Other Provisions

3. In the event that the Settlement Agreement is terminated in accordance with its provisions, the Settlement Agreement and all proceedings had in connection therewith shall be

null and void, except insofar as expressly provided to the contrary in the Settlement Agreement, and without prejudice to the status quo and rights of End-Payor Plaintiffs, HIAMS, and the members of the Settlement Classes.

4. The Court’s provisional certification of the Settlement Classes as provided herein is without prejudice to, or waiver of, the rights of any Defendants to contest certification of any other class proposed in these coordinated actions. The Court’s findings in this Order shall have no effect on the Court’s ruling on any motion to certify any class in these actions or on the Court’s ruling(s) concerning any Defendant’s motion; and no party may cite or refer to the Court’s approval of the Settlement Classes as persuasive or binding authority with respect to any motion to certify any such class or any Defendant’s motion.

5. The Court approves the establishment of nine escrow accounts—one for each of the Settlement Classes—under the Settlement Agreement as qualified settlement funds (“QSF”) pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 468B and the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder, and retains continuing jurisdiction as to any issue that may arise in connection with the formation and/or administration of the QSF. Settlement Class Counsel are, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, authorized to expend funds from the QSF for the payment of the costs of notice, payment of taxes, and settlement administration costs.

6. The litigation against Releasees (as defined in the settlement agreement with HIAMS), in particular HIAMS, Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc. and Hitachi, Ltd. is stayed except to the extent necessary to effectuate the Settlement Agreement.

Dated: _____, 2015

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE